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CRIMINAL LAW
I. THE PROSECUTORIAL DUTY TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY
INFORMATION
A. Introduction
In the landmark decision of Brady v. Maryland,1 the United
States Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's failure to divulge
"evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due pro-
cess when the evidence is material either to guilt or to punish-
ment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecu-
tion."'2 The South Carolina Supreme -Court has considered this
duty to disclose exculpatory information in three recent deci-
sions. In State v. Penland,s the court concluded that the nondis-
closure of a ballistics report favorable to the defendant did not
warrant a new trial, because in light of the trial record as a
whole, it did not create a reasonable doubt about defendant's
guilt. In State v. Mixon,' the court held that the nondisclosure
of a former co-defendant's statement did not affect the outcome
of the trial. In State v. Goodson,5 the court found that the non-
disclosure of evidence which could have been used by the defen-
dant to challenge the credibility of the State's sole witness
raised sufficient questions about the trial results to warrant a
new trial.
The underlying Brady issue in each of these cases is when
and under what circumstances prosecutorial disclosure is neces-
sary to ensure a fair trial. The South Carolina Supreme Court's
narrow construction of the prosecutor's duty to disclose informa-
tion to the defendant arguably has resulted from a misapplica-
tion of the standards for measuring a prosecutor's duty to dis-
close enunciated by the United States Supreme Court.
1. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2. Id. at 87.
3. 275 S.C. 537, 273 S.E.2d 765 (1981).
4. 275 S.C. 575, 274 S.E.2d 406 (1981).
5. 276 S.C. 243, 277 S.E.2d 602 (1981).
1
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B. South Carolina Cases
In Penland, the defendant was charged with the murder of
his live-in girlfriend. The defendant contended that the shooting
was accidental 6 and, at trial, offered testimony of a paid, out-of-
state ballistics expert that the gun used had misfired and that
accidental firing was a possible cause of the victim's death.' Al-
though the State's ballistics tests on the weapon substantially
corroborated the defense expert's testimony," the State's ballis-
tics expert did not testify at trial, and the solicitor did not di-
vulge the favorable test results to the defendant. On the evi-
dence before it, the jury returned a verdict finding defendant
guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
Upon discovering that the prosecution had withheld the ex-
culpatory information, the defendant moved for a new trial on
the ground that the State's corroboration of his expert would
have been material to the jury's deliberations, especially since
the State based its case entirely on circumstantial evidence.9
The trial court denied the motion, and defendant appealed.
The South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the trial
court had not erred in denying the motion. The court offered
6. The defendant's statement related the following account of the shooting. Marcia
McIntyre, the victim, was in the habit of keeping a cocked pistol with her when she was
alone. The night of the shooting, defendant and McIntyre had gone to a few bars and
returned home in the early evening. McIntyre lay down on the couch, complaining that
the drinks were going to her head. The defendant went out again, but McIntyre stayed
at home. When the defendant was returning home, his car became stuck and he was
unable to free it. He walked home to get McIntyre's help, but was unable to awaken her
from the couch. He cursed her and walked away. McIntyre then awoke and pointed the
pistol, in a cocked position, at him. The defendant wrestled the gun away from her. The
pistol accidentally fired while the defendant was uncocking it, killing McIntyre. Record
at 68-69,
7. The defense expert testified that an accidental firing could occur during the un-
cocking procedure if one's thumb slipped off the hammer. He also said that the possibil-
ity of such an accidental firing would be increased if the handler's hands were wet. Re-
cord at 133. The defense contended that defendant's attempt to free his car and his
wrestling the pistol away from his girlfriend, caused perspiration on the defendant's
hands. Reply Brief for Appellant at 3-4.
8. The prosecution admitted this corroboration. Record at 254-55. At trial, the State
presented the testimony of a police officer who emphasized the unlikelihood of a mis-
firing. The defense challenged the expert status of the officer and the State responded
that the officer was not being presented as an expert. Further, the State claimed that
expert testimony was forthcoming, but never presented it.
9. Record at 125; Brief for Appellant at 12.
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two justifications for its decision: (1) the State's failure to dis-
close its own ballistics report to defendant did not create a rea-
sonable doubt about defendant's guilt,10 and (2) because the
"exculpatory evidence [was] equally available upon request to
the accused, the State [had] no obligation to furnish such
evidence.""
In United States v. Agurs,2 the United States Supreme
Court established two standards for determining when, under
Brady, a prosecutor has a duty to disclose exculpatory informa-
tion to a criminal defendant. The first standard applies to cases
in which the defense has made a specific Brady request or de-
mand; the other applies to cases in which no request or only a
general request for information has been made. When the de-
fense makes a specific Brady request for information favorable
to the defendant and the prosecution does not respond, the con-
viction must-be set aside if the nondisclosed information was
material. This materiality standard requires a determination of
whether the nondisclosed information might have affected the
outcome of the trial, in effect, a "possible effect" standard. 8
The second standard applies to circumstances in which the
defense has made no request, or has made only a general request
for all Brady material or any exculpatory information.24 In these
instances, a conviction will stand unless the nondisclosed infor-
mation, in light of the entire trial record, creates in the mind of
the trial judge a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt.15
Although this test acknowledges a duty to disclose without a re-
quest by the defendant, the test requires a much more substan-
tial showing on appeal than does the standard for specific
10. 275 S.C. at 540, 273 S.E.2d at 766 (citing State v. Goodson, 273 S.C. 264, 265,
255 S.E.2d 679, 680 (1979)).
11. 275 S.C. at 540, 273 S.E.2d at 767 (citations omitted).
12. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). The Brady duty developed through a series of plurality opin-
ions, many rendered by Courts with very different memberships. The decision in Agurs,
however, the most recent discussion of the prosecutorial disclosure duty, was a clear 7-2
decision by a Court with a membership much the same as today's Court. This Survey,
therefore, will focus on the Agurs decision.
13. Id. at 104. The Court noted in Agurs that the defendant should not have to bear
the burden of showing that the undisclosed information probably would have resulted in
acquittal. Id. at 111.
14. The Court stated that the purpose of the request was to put the prosecution on
notice. A general request does not do so, and therefore, is treated as if no request had
been made. Id. at 106-07.
15. Id. at 112-13.
1982]
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requests. 16
In Penland, controversy existed over whether the defense
made a Brady request.17 Because the court applied the reasona-
ble doubt test of Agurs, it apparently decided that no request
had been made. The court concluded that the nondisclosed in-
formation, viewed in light of the record as a whole, did not cre-
ate a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt.18 Because
the court reached this conclusion with little discussion,19 the
Penland opinion offers little insight into the court's treatment of
the reasonable doubt test.
The United States Supreme Court has not directly consid-
ered the effect of a defendant's access to exculpatory informa-
tion on the State's duty to divulge that information, but federal
and state courts have developed and applied an availability test
to Brady appeals. The South Carolina Supreme Court first ap-
plied the test in Anderson v. Leeke:20 "[W]here evidence is
equally available to the accused, the obligation on the part of
the State to furnish such evidence to the accused is relieved.1
21
In adopting this test, the court relied heavily on two federal
16. Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the South Carolina Supreme
Court has addressed the question of when disclosure must be made. The lower federal
courts that have considered this issue have reached varying conclusions, some requiring
pretrial disclosure and others requiring disclosure before the end of trial. In the final
analysis, the key consideration in these cases is the effect that the timing of disclosure
had on the defendant's trial. See WHrrREA, CRuaNAL PROCEDURm AN ANALYSIS OF
CONSTrrTUONAL CASES AND CONCEPTS 400-02 (1980).
17. The defense stated that no formal Brady motion was made because the defense
and prosecution had reached a full disclosure agreement in a pretrial chambers meeting
before a different judge. Further, the defense stated that the prosecution had turned
over its file. Reply Brief for Appellant at 11. The prosecution's file, however, did not
contain the ballistics report. That report was never written down, but the prosecution
admitted knowing of the results through telephone conversations with the state expert.
Record at 254-55. The prosecution, represented by a solicitor not present at the cham-
ber's meeting, refused to stipulate the accuracy of the defense discovery contention.
Thus, it was not included in the record, but the defense did bring this matter to the
court's attention. Reply Brief for Appellant at 7 n.1.
This situation offers two lessons for the defense attorney. First, whenever the prose-
cution turns over its file, its contents should be carefully examined and its omissions
noted. Second, despite an informal discovery agreement, a formal Brady request should
always be made for appeal purposes.
18. 275 S.C. at 540, 273 S.E.2d at 766.
19. See Id. at 540, 273 S.E.2d at 766-67 (1978).
20. 271 S.C. 435, 248 S.E.2d 120 (1978).
21. Id. at 439, 248 S.E.2d at 122.
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court decisions22 that share with Anderson a common element
not present in Penland: The undisclosed information in those
cases was a matter of public record.28
In Penland, the supreme court ruled that because the de-
fendant's ballistics expert was aware that the State had con-
ducted pretrial tests with the murder weapon, the results of
those tests were "available" to the defendant.24 Thus, although
the defendant himself had no actual knowledge of the State's
tests until after the trial, 5 the court appears to have imputed to
him knowledge the defense expert may have had.2'
The procedure by which the court expected the defendant
to obtain the exculpatory information is not clear. Arguably, the
defense made a pretrial Brady request for the type of informa-
tion contained in the ballistics tests;27 although the prosecution
clearly knew the results of the tests, that information was not
divulged.28 Moreover, because of the uncertainty of the testi-
mony that might be given, defense counsel probably would not
call a State ballistics expert as a witness. Thus, Penland raises
several serious questions about South Carolina's availability test.
The defendant in Mixon was arrested with two co-defen-
dants, Collins and Smith, and was charged with possession of
the drug PCP with intent to distribute.2 9 Co-defendant Collins
was not prosecuted;30 co-defendant Smith negotiated with the
22. Id. at 438, 248 S.E.2d at 122. The court cited DeBerry v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1336
(8th Cir. 1975) and United States v. Soblen, 301 F.2d 236 (2nd Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 944 (1962).
23. See DeBerry v. Wolff, 513 F.2d at 1340; United States v. Soblen, 301 F.2d at
242; Anderson v. Leeke, 271 S.C. 435, 438, 248 S.E.2d 120, 121 (1978). In Penland, the
ballistics report had never been written down and therefore was not in the record. Re-
cord at 254-55.
24. 275 S.C. at 540, 273 S.E.2d at 766-67.
25. Record at 125, 129.
26. The prosecution argued that the defendant knew that the State had tested the
weapon, and the court apparently accepted this argument. Brief for Respondent at 5. A
reading of the record, however, does not clearly show that the defendant knew that the
State had conducted ballistics tests. Record at 8, 10. Moreover, it is not clear that the
defense expert knew the actual results of the State's tests, or even that the State had
conducted tests before or during the trial. The defense expert testified that the State's
expert was present during his tests, Record at 125, 129, but his testimony did not reveal
that he knew of the State's expert's tests or results.
27. See supra note 17.
28. Id.
29. 275 S.C. at 578, 274 S.E.2d at 407.
30. Id.
1982]
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solicitor and pleaded guilty to the charge of simple possession.31
Before her trial, the defendant made a Brady demand re-
questing exculpatory statements made by co-defendants.2 In a
statement to the police, Collins declared that he and the defen-
dant had refused offers of the drug THC from Smith and that
Smith had told him on several occasions that the seized PCP
was his and his alone.33 Although the solicitor's office had a re-
cording of Collin's statement," the prosecution did not disclose
it to the defense before or during the trial.
After the defendant was convicted and sentenced, she
learned of Collins' statement and successfully moved for a post-
trial hearing on the matter. The trial judge reviewed only that
portion of Collins' statement relating to the offer and refusal of
THC, but misinterpreted Collins' statement to mean that PCP
rather than THC had been offered and refused.3 5 In addition,
Smith testified at the hearing that the PCP was for his personal
use and that neither the defendant nor Collins knew anything
about it.38 On the basis of this incomplete information, the trial
court granted a new trial, and the State appealed.
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court noted that
the State's failure to respond to a specific and relevant request
would seldom, if ever, be excused, 7 but characterized defen-
31. Record at 11.
32. The defense served the following Brady demand:
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned on behalf of the
above named Defendant hereby demands that you provide him any and all
exculpatory information which would tend to mitigate or lessen the offense
charged and any sentence arising out of the offense charged.
The Defendant particularly demands the following.
1 ....
5. Any statements made by this Defendant's codefendants.
275 S.C. at 578-79, 274 S.E.2d at 407-08.
33. Record at 178-79, 181.
34. 275 S.C. at 579, 274 S.E.2d at 408.
35. Record at 170; Brief for Respondent at 2. The record of Collins' statement, tran-
scribed from tape, showed Collins saying THC. Record at 178. Yet, the interrogating
officer, according to the printed record, referred to the offered substance as "PCP, [or]
THC as you call it." Record at 181. The trial judge on record referred to the offered
substance as PCP. Record at 170. The prosecutor played the recorded statement for the
court but did not play the portion about Smith's confession. Record at 168.
36. Record at 160.
37. 275 S.C. at 583, 274 S.E.2d at 409 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
106 (1976)).
[Vol. 34
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dant's Brady motion as a general request.8 Considering the ma-
teriality of the withheld information, the court found Collins'
statement concerning the offer and refusal of THC insignificant
because it concerned a drug other than the one for which defen-
dant was charged. 9 Even assuming that Collins had meant PCP
rather than THC, the defendant had testified at trial that she
and Smith had no conversations concerning PCP and Collins'
statement would therefore challenge rather than enhance the de-
fendant's credibility40 The court concluded that the suppressed
evidence would not have affected the result at trial and reversed
the trial court's decision to grant defendant a new trial.4 1
The supreme court's decision in Mixon is troublesome in
several respects. The court did not discuss the exculpatory char-
acteristics of Collins' statement about Smith's confession of sole
ownership and control of the P.P 2 Moreover, although the
court discussed several different standards for measuring the
prosecutorial duty to disclose, which standard the court actually
applied is unclear.
The supreme court initially stated that it would review the
matter as it would a motion for a new trial based on after-dis-
covered evidence.43 This standard requires a determination of
38. The court stated:
[t]he Brady demand made in this case is somewhat of a blunderbuss shot into
the air in hopes that some game would fall to the earth. If it is a valid demand,
it can be argued that all police officers who know anything whatsoever conceiv-
ably favorable to a defendant should reveal the same for the benefit of defense
counsel. Brady does not go this far.
Id. at 581, 274 S.E.2d at 408. There are three problems with the court's statement. First,
the defendant's request was quite specific. See supra note 32. Second, the court implies
that the prosecution did not know of the statement, but it clearly did. See 275 S.C. at
579-80, 274 S.E.2d at 408. Third, the officer taking the statement was the arresting of-
ficer, interrogating officer, and the State's main witness. As such, his relationship to the
prosecution is arguably close enough to warrant charging the prosecution with the of-
ficer's knowledge even if the prosecution had no actual knowledge. See, Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). See also Evens v. Kropp, 254 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mich. 1966).
The court may have considered the request so specific that it was general due to its
comprehensiveness. However, this consideration would be manifestly unfair to the defen-
dant; it would place the defense in the position of having to make a Brady request that
was specific, but not too speicific.
39. 275 S.C. at 581, 274 S.E.2d at 409.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 585, 274 S.E.2d at 410.
42. This is true despite the fact that the Record at 179, 181, and the Brief for Ap-
pellant at 2, were before the court and referred to Smith's confession.
43. 275 S.C. at 578, 274 S.E.2d at 407.
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whether the new evidence would probably have changed the re-
sult at trial.44 The court then noted with approval the Brady
standard, which focuses on whether the suppressed evidence
might have affected the result of the trial.45 The court also men-
tioned the reasonable doubt standard of materiality articulated
in United States v. Agurs.46 Finally, the court noted that its own
equal availability test was applicable to the facts in Mixon.47
The court's simple conclusion that "the information alleged
to have been withheld. . . would not have affected the result,"
4 8
suggests that it did not apply the reasonable doubt standard. Its
characterization of the Brady request as a general request sug-
gests that the court applied the probable effect standard rather
than the possible effect standard. The degree to which the
court's decision was influenced by the availability test is unclear.
The request for information in Mixon seems sufficiently
specific under Brady v. Maryland to warrant application of the
possible effect standard of Brady. As in Mixon, the defense re-
quest deemed "specific" in Brady was to examine extrajudicial
statements made by a co-defendant.4'9 The nondisclosed state-
ment in Brady was an admission of guilt by the co-defendant.5 0
Although the nondisclosed statement in Mixon was not an ad-
mission of the declarant's own guilt, it related to an admission of
guilt by another co-defendant.51 In addition, the nondisclosed
statements in both Brady and Mixon directly supported the de-
fendants' testimony at trial.52 These substantial similarities indi-
cate that the request in Mixon should have been considered spe-
cific and that the possible effect standard should have been
applied.
The exculpatory evidence withheld in Mixon, particularly
44. Id. at 582, 274 S.E.2d at 409.
45. Id. (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
46. Id. at 584, 274 S.E.2d at 410.
47. Id. at 585, 274 S.E.2d at 410.
48. Id. at 584-85, 274 S.E.2d at 410.
49. 373 U.S. at 84.
50. Id.
51. The defendant in Brady admitted being guilty of murder. His codefendant also
admitted guilt. Thus, the undisclosed information in Brady went to punishment whereas
the undisclosed information in Mixon went to the defendant's guilt.
52. The defendant in Brady testified that his codefendant had done the actual kill-
ing. 373 U.S. at 84. The defendant in Mixon testified that she knew nothing about the
PCP. Record at 125, 131.
[Vol. 34
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Smith's confession at the hearing on sole possession of the PCP,
clearly might have affected the outcome of the defendant's trial.
No hard physical evidence established the defendant's posses-
sion of PCP.53 The State relied solely on the testimony of the
arresting, interrogating officer." Mixon had challenged that of-
ficer's credibility and had accused him of blackmail.55 Smith's
confession not only would have directly supported defendant's
claim of innocence but also would have corroborated her chal-
lenge to the officer's credibility. Notably, in State v. Goodson,
the third Brady case discussed in this Survey, the nondisclosed
information challenged the credibility of the State's main wit-
ness and the South Carolina Supreme Court recognized the de-
fendant's right to a new trial.5 6 Thus, had the court applied what
appears to be the appropriate standard-the possible effect
standard-it might have reached a different result.
57
The availability test also does not appear to justify the non-
disclosure of the information in Mixon. The defendant had no
personal knowledge of Smith's admission of sole possession, and
the record of Smith's plea did not reveal the admission. More-
over, the record of the defendant's trial does not reveal that any
member of the defense team knew of Collins' statement or of its
contents. Although, arguably, the defense could have called Col-
lins as a witness and thereby made the information available, it
had no reason to do so. The defense believed that the prosecu-
tion would call Collins to testify at trial and was unaware that
Collins had made a statement.5 Moreover, Collins was out-of-
53. The arresting officer discovered the PCP on the ground between Mixon and
Smith. 275 S.C. at 578, 274 S.E.2d at 407.
54. Record at 85-115. The critical part of the officer's testimony was that Mixon had
admitted to him that she was going to sell the PCP for Smith.
55. Record at 126-27.
56. These credibility questions should be approached with caution and probably
best left to the trial process of examination, cross-examination, and jury deliberation
once the jury has all of the admissible evidence before it. Since Smith had already made
a deal with the State, his confession of sole possession did not threaten him with punish-
ment. In addition, if the defendant actually was selling drugs for Smith, keeping her out
of jail might be in his best interest. It should be noted, however, that Smith apparently
admitted sole possession before he made a deal with the State. See supra note 33 and
accompanying text.
57. Admittedly the facts in that case are more compelling than those in Mixon. See
infra notes 60-61 and accompanying test.
58. See Record at 16, 17, 140.
1982]
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state at the time of trial. 9 Consequently, it would appear to be
unfair to consider his testimony as being equally available to the
defendant.
In Goodson, the defendant was charged with housebreaking,
grand larceny, and safecracking.60 In his defense, Goodson
claimed that his brother, the State's sole witness against him,
committed the actual theft and that he was guilty only of receiv-
ing stolen goods.6' Before trial, the defense made a Brady mo-
tion for all physical evidence favorable to the defendant.6 2 The
solicitor, however, failed to disclose a picture of defendant's
brother taken from film found in a camera stolen from the Al-
lendale Highway Department.6 At trial, the brother testified
that the defendant left one evening and returned later with
property stolen from the Allendale Highway Department;" de-
fendant was convicted. The defendant subsequently learned of
the suppressed photograph and moved for a new trial. The trial
court denied the motion and the defendant appealed.
The South Carolina Supreme Court began its appraisal of
Goodson's appeal by finding the defendant's Brady request too
general to merit consideration under the possible effect stan-
dard. 8 The court, therefore, applied the reasonable doubt test of
Agurs, but concluded that the facts of Goodson satisfied that
test." The court emphasized that the nondisclosed information
challenged the credibility of the State's only witness.6 7
The Brady request in Goodson exemplifies a particularly
difficult Brady question: how specific must the request be to be
considered under the possible effect standard? The request in
Goodson was for physical evidence-the photograph of the de-
fendant's brother certainly was favorable physical evidence. In
59. 275 S.C. at 580, 274 S.E.2d at 408.
60. 276 S.C. at 244, 277 S.E.2d at 603.
61. Id. at 246, 277 S.E.2d at 604.
62. The South Carolina Supreme Court heard this matter previously, see State v.
Goodson, 273 S.C. 264, 255 S.E.2d 679 (1979), and remanded it for consideration under
the reasonable doubt test of Agurs. The trial court's treatment upon remand is the sub-
ject of the supreme court opinion considered in this Survey.
63. 276 S.C. at 246-47, 277 S.E.2d at 604.
64. Id. at 246, 277 S.E.2d at 604.
65. Id. at 244-45, 27 S.E.2d at 603 (citing State v. Goodson, 273 S.C. 265, 255 S.E.2d
679 (1979)).
66. Id. at 247, 277 S.E.2d at 604-05.
67. Id. at 247-48, 277 S.E.2d at 604-05.
[Vol. 34
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Agurs, the United States Supreme Court indicated that a re-
quest is specific if it gives the prosecutor notice of exactly what
the defense wants and does not require unlimited discovery of
the State's evidence.6 8 Whether the Goodson request served this
notice function is uncertain. It is difficult to imagine how the
defense might have made the physical evidence request more
specific without actually knowing of the existence of the photo-
graph of the defendant's brother. Yet, the request was so general
that, to comply, the prosecution would have had to review all of
its physical evidence.
Perhaps the amount of physical evidence present in a case
should be considered by courts in determining the scope of a
prosecutor's duty to disclose. Certainly this would mitigate the
burden placed on prosecutors by Brady requests. If there is a
substantial amount of physical evidence, and if the defense is
generally aware of the amounts and types of physical evidence in
the case, requiring the defense request to be more specific than a
simple request for exculpatory physical evidence is not
unreasonable.e9
The South Carolina Supreme Court in Goodson may have
considered the amount of physical evidence. Many things were
stolen from the Allendale Highway Department, the defense was
generally aware of what was stolen, and the favorable evidence
was contained in this physical evidence. However, how or why
the court concluded that the defendant's request for physical ev-
idence was general rather than specific is not clear.
C. Conclusion
As illustrated by Penland and Mixon, the South Carolina
Supreme Court has narrowly construed the duty of prosecutors
under Brady v. Maryland to disclose exculpatory information.
70
68. 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
69. This consideration presents at least two problems. First, how much physical evi-
dence is sufficient to require such specificity? Second, what should the result be when
there is a large amount of physical evidence and the undisclosed evidence is unknown to
the defense or is of a different type? These problems question the use of this "anount of
evidence" test.
70. Perhaps the court's restrictive application of the Brady and Agurs standards is
in defense of the state rule against criminal discovery. The South Carolina Brady cases
and certain language contained therein support this conclusion. For example, in State v.
Hill, 268 S.C. 390, 234 S.E.2d 219 (1977), the supreme court stated that "[a]lthough the
1982]
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The court has been reluctant to find a Brady request specific
enough to warrant applying the possible effects standard; in fact,
the court has never clearly applied that standard. Although a
new trial was granted in Goodson, that case does not appear to
represent a trend away from the court's restrictive approach to
Brady issues. Rather, Goodson indicates that a new trial will be
deemed appropriate only when the evidence withheld from a de-
fendant is highly exculpatory, such as inf6rmation that seriously
challenges the credibility of the State's main witness.
Thus, the recent decisions suggest that South Carolina de-
fense attorneys should avoid relying too heavily on Brady ap-
peals. Despite their unfavorable overtones, however, the cases do
provide some guidance for structuring successful appeals. As a
preliminary matter, defense counsel can enhance the probability
of success on appeal by drafting Brady requests with great spec-
ificity and exhaustive comprehensiveness. Unfortunately, the
South Carolina case law offers no guidance regarding how Brady
requests can be made sufficiently specific to trigger the material-
ity standard of Brady v. Maryland. Thus, the defense attorney
should always be prepared to argue alternatively the possible ef-
fect and the reasonable doubt standards. Moreover, whenever
possible, a defense attorney should emphasize that the undis-
closed information could have been used at trial to challenge the
credibility of the State's witnesses.
Finally, when presenting a Brady appeal, the defense attor-
ney should be prepared to satisfy the availability test although
the scope and significance of this test are unclear. Penland indi-
cates that pretrial vigilance may be the key to meeting the test.
To avoid a determination that the suppressed evidence was
appellant does not have to show, and indeed may be unable to show, that the evidence
which he seeks to have produced would be admissible at the trial, he does have to show
some better cause for inspection than a mere desire." Id. at 394-95, 234 S.E.2d at 221. In
Anderson v. Leeke, 271 S.C. 435, 248 S.E.2d 120 (1978), the court stated that "Brady
does not shift to the State the burden of gathering evidence for the defense." Id. at 439,
248 S.E.2d at 122. In State v. Gambrel, 274 S.C. 587, 266 S.E.2d 78 (1980), the court
stated that "[a]ppellant's discovery motions were pursuant to Brady v. Maryland .. ,
and a mutual discovery provision promulgated by the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit. That
local rule was declared unconstitutional in State v. Duncan, (citation omitted)." Id. at
591, 266 S.E.2d at 81. In State v. Cox, 274 S.C. 624, 266 S.E.2d 784 (1980), the court
stated that "where evidence is equally available to the accused, the State has no obliga-
tion to furnish such evidence." Id. at 629, 266 S.E.2d at 787, cited with approval in State
v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 540, 273 S.E.2d 765, 766-67 (1981).
[Vol. 34
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"equally available" to a defendant, the defense attorney should
debrief any member of the defense team who comes into contact
with the prosecution, to determine if that member's knowledge
might be imputed to the defendant.
Robert L. Widener
II. JUDICIAL PARTICIPATION IN PLEA BARGAINING
Within the past four years, the South Carolina Supreme
Court has twice held that "a judge should not initiate or influ-
ence a plea bargain agreement, nor be a party to the negotia-
tions."'71 This position was in accord with the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.72 However, in Harden v. State'3 and Med-
lin v. State,7 4 the court 5 discussed and approved judicial partic-
ipation in the plea bargaining process prior to the judge's taking
of the actual plea. Noting significant factual distinctions be-
tween the two sets of cases, the court took the opportunity in
Harden and Medlin to first reinterpret its holdings in the prior
cases, State v. Cross76 and Beaver v. State,7 7 and second, to
adopt the American Bar Association (ABA) Standard for judicial
participation in the plea bargaining process.78 These decisions
71. See Beaver v. State, 271 S.C. 381, 383, 247 S.E.2d 448, 449 (1978); State v. Cross,
270 S.C. 44, 48, 240 S.E.2d 514, 516 (1977).
72. See FED. R. CRLm. P. 11. The rule provides in part that "the court shall not
participate in any such [pleabargaining] discussions." Id.
73. 276 S.C. 249, 277 S.E.2d 692 (1981)(per curiam).
74. - S.C. -, 280 S.E.2d 648 (1981).
75. Four justices participated in the per curiam Harden decision affirming the find-
ing of the post-conviction relief hearing that the guilty plea was voluntary. Two justices
advocated the adoption of Standard 14-3.3 and discussed the policy considerations of
judicial participation in plea bargaining. The court quoted the entire standard in the
plurality opinion. 276 S.C. at 253-55, 277 S.E.2d at 694-95. In Medlin, the supreme court
adopted Standard 14-3.3 as the guideline for judicial participation in the plea bargaining
process. - S.C. at -, 280 S.E.2d at 648. The majority in Medlin did not restate the
plurality position in Harden, but did adopt the standard on the basis of that decision.
Thus, subsequent references to "the court's" reasoning may be to the Harden decision,
even though the court did not adopt the standard until the later Medlin case.
76. 270 S.C. 44, 240 S.E.2d 514 (1977).
77. 271 S.C. 381, 247 S.E.2d 448 (1978).
78. - S.C. at -, 280 S.E.2d at 648. The court adopted the standard set forth in
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GuwT § 14-3.3. (ABA 2d ed. 1980), which
provides as follows:
Standard 14-3.3. Responsibilities of the Judge
(a) The judge should not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
13
Widener et al.: Criminal Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
80 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
place South Carolina in a minority position because the ABA
without first inquiring whether the parties have arrived at a plea agreement
and, if there is one, requiring that its terms, conditions, and reasons be
disclosed.
(b) If a plea agreement has been reached by the parties which contem-
plates the granting of a charge or sentence concessions by the judge, the judge
should:
(i) order the preparation of a preplea or presentence report, when
needed for determining the appropriate disposition;
(ii) give the agreement due consideration but notwithstanding its
existence reach an independent decision on whether to grant charge or
sentence concessions; and
(iii) in every case advise the defendant whether the judge accepts or
rejects the contemplated charge or sentence concessions or whether a
decision on acceptance will be deferred until after the plea is entered
and/or a preplea of presentence report is received.
(c) When the parties are unable to reach a plea agreement, if the defen-
dant's counsel and prosecutor agree, they may request to meet with the judge
in order to discuss a plea agreement. If the judge agrees to meet with the par-
ties, the judge shall serve as a moderator in listening to their respective
presentations concerning appropriate charge or sentence concessions. Follow-
ing the presentation of the parties, the judge may indicate what charge or sen-
tence concessions would be acceptable or whether the judge wishes to have a
preplea report before rendering a decision. The parties may thereupon decide
among themselves, outside of the presence of the court, whether to accept or
reject the plea agreement tendered by the court.
(d) Whenever the judge is presented with a plea agreement or consents to
a conference in order to listen to the parties concerning charge or sentence
concessions, the court may require or allow any person, including the defen-
dant, the alleged victim, and others, to appear or to testify.
(e) Where the parties have neither advised the judge of a plea agreement
nor requested to meet for plea discussion purposes, the judge may inquire of
the parties whether disposition without trial has been explored and may allow
an adjournment to enable plea discussions to occur.
(f) All discussions at which the judge is present relating to plea agree-
ments should be recorded verbatim and preserved, except that for good cause
the judge may order the transcript of proceedings to be sealed. Such discus-
sions should be held in open court unless good cause is present for the proceed-
ings to be held in chambers. Except as otherwise provided in this standard, the
judge should never through words or demeanor either directly or indirectly,
communicate to the defendant or defense counsel that a plea agreement should
be accepted or that a guilty plea should be entered.
(g) In cases where a defendant offers to plead guilty and the judge decides
that the final disposition should not include the charge or sentence concessions
contemplated by the plea agreement, the judge shall so advise the defendant
and permit withdrawal of the tender of the plea. In cases where a defendant
pleads guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and the court, following entry of
the plea, decides that the final disposition should not include the contemplated
charge or sentence concessions, withdrawal of the plea shall be allowed if:
(i) prior to the entry of the plea the judge concurs, whether tenta-
tively or fully, in the proposed change [sic] or sentence concessions; or
14
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Standards have been adopted in principle by only one other
state, 7  although a few states have recognized judicial participa-
tion in the plea bargaining process through their court rules or
statutes. s0
The appellant in Harden v. State pleaded guilty to distribu-
tion of marijuana to a minor and contributing to the delin-
quency of a minor. Prior to his plea, the appellant's attorney
told him the judge was under time pressure and a decision had
to be made soon about the plea.81 The attorney also informed
the appellant of a proposed sentence range suggested by the trial
judge."2
In Medlin v. State, the appellant pleaded guilty to three in-
dictments and was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprison-
ment. 3 Again, the trial judge participated in the plea bargaining
process."s
On appeal to the supreme court, both appellants argued
(ii) the guilty plea is entered upon the express condition, approved
by the judge, that the plea can be withdrawn if the charge or sentence
concessions are subsequently rejected by the court.
In all other cases where a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement and the judge decides that the final disposition should not include
the contemplated charge or sentence concessions, withdrawal of the plea may
be permitted in the discretion of the judge.
79. In State v. Pouncey, - Wash. App. -, 630 P.2d 932 (1981), the Washington
Supreme Court stated the following.
[W]e accept the principles of ABA Standards 14-3.3(c)-(f) until a more explicit
rule is promulgated locally. Those standards limit the trial judge's involvement
in the process to an inquiry whether the adversaries have explored disposition
of the cause [sic] without trial with the admonition that the judge should
never, directly or indirectly, communicate to defendant or his counsel that a
guilty plea should be entered or that an agreement (or proposal) should be
accepted.
Id. at -, 630 P.2d at 936.
80. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.171 (1980) permits unlimited judicial participation in plea
negotiations. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 A § 402 (Smith-Hurd 1976) prohibits judicial initia-
tion of plea bargaining but does allow judicial participation in that process. N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 15A-1021 to 1027 (Supp. 1979) allows the trial judge to participate in plea bar-
gaining discussions. For an analysis of plea bargaining in North Carolina, see Lefstein,
Plea Bargaining and the Trial Judge, The New ABA Standards, and the Need to Con-
trol Judicial Discretion, 59 N.C.L. RIv. 477 (1981). Vermont also permits the trial judge
to participate in plea discussions if the discussions are on the record. VT. R. CaM. P.
11(e)(1974 and Supp. 1981).
81. 276 S.C. at 251, 277 S.E.2d at 693.
82. Id.
83. - S.C. at -, 280 S.E.2d at 649.
84. Id. at -, 280 S.E.2d at 649.
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that the decisions in Cross and Beaver mandated invalidation of
the guilty pleas. The appellant in Harden maintained that Cross
and Beaver established a per se rule that "participation by the
trial judge in plea bargaining prior to sentencing is, in and of
itself, sufficient to render the entry of any plea of guilty subse-
quent to such participation involuntary and hence one the with-
drawal of which must be allowed." 85 The appellant in Medlin
argued his plea was involuntary because the judge's participa-
tion in the plea negotiations put undue influence on him to
plead guilty and accept the plea that was discussed by the judge,
solicitor, and defense counsel."'
The State in both cases emphasized the factual differences
between the two prior cases and Harden and Medlin. In both
Cross and Beaver, the judge clearly implied that he would be
more severe in sentencing if the appellant continued with the
trial and was found guilty. 7 The State attempted to distinguish
the coerciveness of the judge's behavior in those cases from the
judge's comments in Harden, which arguably indicated only his
awareness of the ongoing plea discussions. In Medlin, the court
noted that the record was "devoid of any threats of any credible
showing that the Appellant gave up any constitutional rights
due to the trial court's participation.8
Thus, the supreme court in Harden and Medlin was faced
with either confirming the apparent per se ruling of Cross and
85. Brief for Appellant at 4.
86. Brief for Appellant at 1-2.
87. 270 S.C. at 47, 240 S.E.2d at 514; 271 S.C. at 382, 247 S.E.2d at 449.
88. Brief for Respondent at 5. The State argued that the supreme court had not
created a per se ruling that any involvement, however slight, by the trial court in the
plea bargaining process constituted undue coercion as a matter of law. The State quoted
the supreme court's statement in Cross that "[w]e hold under the facts of this case that
the defendant was unduly coerced." Id. at 3-4, (citing State v. Cross, 270 S.C. 44, 50, 249
S.E.2d 514, 517 (1977)).
A commentator on the Cross and Beaver decisions discussed the conflicts and at-
tending problems of a broad versus narrow construction of their holdings, and criticized
the cases as not being clear or precise, urging the following.
[a] detailed opinion or court-promulgated rule is needed to delineate the exact
purpose and extent of judicial participation in plea negotiations. When the
court, legislature, and bar association develop definite procedures that will
make plea negotiations uniform, fair, and public, examples of coercion and
misuse such as those in Cross hopefully will not arise.
Comment, South Carolina Supreme Court Admonishes Judicial Participation in Plea
Bargaining, 30 S.C.L. REv. 613, 624 (1979).
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol34/iss1/8
CRIMINAL LAW
Beaver that the judge should never be involved in the plea bar-
gaining process,8 9 or limiting Cross and Beaver as decisions that
simply corrected an after-the-fact finding of actual coercion by
the trial judge.90 The court chose the latter approach and
adopted American Bar Association Standard 14-3.3, which al-
lows judicial participation in plea bargaining and establishes
guidelines for such participation.9 These guidelines include pro-
visions regarding, inter alia, presentencing reports; judicial mod-
eration of the plea conference provided both parties request it
and the judge consents; the presence of the defendant, alleged
victim and others at the plea conference; the judge's neutral de-
meanor at the conference; and verbatim records of the discus-
sions with the judge.92
The supreme court acknowledged the controversy surround-
ing plea bargaining and the advantage of preventing judges from
participating in the plea bargaining process. However, the court
was concerned that if the trial judge is prevented from partici-
pating in plea bargaining both the defendant and the prosecutor
will be deprived of the information they need to know when dis-
cussing the plea bargain-the upper limit of the sentence con-
templated by the judge." This concern prompted the court to
adopt the American Bar Association position, which it consid-
ered a reasonable approach to plea bargaining: "It [ABA Stan-
dard 14-3.3] provides access by the State and the defendant to
the judge, and yet provides standards to guide all concerned so
that the fear of coercion in the plea-bargain process ... should
89. The court referred to this position as the "insurance approach" By never al-
lowing the judge to participate in plea bargaining, the court could insure against judicial
coercion. As the court noted, many commentators favor this approach as enhancing gen-
eral respect for the neutrality of the court and helping judicial economy. 276 S.C. at 253,
277 S.E.2d at 693-94. Accord United States ex rel Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
90. The court under this approach would look at the totality of the circumstances to
determine if the judge's participation had rendered the guilty plea involuntary. See gen-
erally Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. REv.
1059 (1976); Lambros, Plea Bargaining and the Sentencing Process, 53 F.R.D. 509
(1971).
91. - S.C. at , 280 S.E.2d at 648. The Harden plurality observed that the lan-
guage in Cross and Beaver was broader than the factual situation warranted, 276 S.C. at
252, 277 S.E.2d at 693, and specifically discontinued adherence to the apparent position
of FED. R. CraM. P. 11, 276 S.C. at 256, 277 S.E.2d at 695.
92. See supra note 78 for the full text of the standard.
93. 276 S.C. at 253, 277 S.E.2d at 694.
1982]
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be minimal." 4
The strong dissent in Medlin questioned the abrupt intro-
duction of these as yet untested standards and argued that a
change of this magnitude should not occur without input from
the Attorney General and members of the legal community.
9 5
The dissent reasoned that the rule allowing judicial initiation of
or participation in the plea bargaining process is "inherently
bad," observing that it gives an accused and his attorney "one
more weapon in pursuit of leniency." 6 The dissent also believed
that the rule would encourage judge shopping, increase the dis-
parity in sentences, and undermine, if not destroy, the ability of
the trial court judge to remain impartial to a defendant who has
admitted guilt in a bargaining session. 7 Other objections cited
by the dissent were that the presence of a judge at a plea bar-
gaining conference is inherently coercive, that a negotiation be-
tween a judge and defendant impairs the former's ability to rule
on the voluntariness of the latter's confession, and that the rule
weakens the bargaining power of the prosecutor.98
94. Id. at 256, 277 S.E.2d at 695.
95. - S.C. at -, 280 S.E.2d at 650 (Littlejohn and Gregory, JJ., concurring and
dissenting).
96. Id. at -, 280 S.E.2d at 650 (Littlejohn and Gregory, JJ., concurring and
dissenting).
97. Id. at -, 280 S.E.2d at 651 (Littlejohn and Gregory, JJ., concurring and dis-
senting). Alschuler quotes one justice's comment on the problem of a judge's remaining
impartial after participating in plea bargaining:
Judges frequently rule on potentially prejudicial matters in advance of trial.
They may even suppress evidence that would, if admitted, conclusively estab-
lish 'a defendant's guilt without disqualifying themselves from further partici-
pation. A judge's participation in plea bargaining need not be treated differ-
ently from other activities that could conceivably give rise to prejudice in the
conduct of a trial but that usually do not pose significant problems.
Alschuler, supra note 90 at 1110.
98. - S.C. at -, 280 S.E.2d at 651 (Littlejohn and Gregory, JJ., concurring and
dissenting). In regard to the coerciveness of the trial judge, one author makes the point
that a judge who participates in a plea bargaining conference would not necessarily influ-
ence a defendant to any greater degree than would a prosecutor. Certainly the point of
the standards is to structure the judicial participation in a noncoercive manner. See
Schlesinger and Malloy, Plea Bargaining and the Judiciary: An Argument for Reform,
30 DRAKE L. REV. 581, 590 (1981). Another concern expressed in the Medlin dissent was
that these standards would require judges to testify in many more post-conviction relief
hearings. - S.C. at -, 280 S.E.2d at 650 (Littlejohn and Gregory, JJ., concurring and
dissenting). With a verbatim record of the plea conference, however, the number of ap-
peals based on coerciveness should decrease. See Schlesinger and Malloy, supra note 96
at 589; Alschuler, supra note 90 at 1132.
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The Harden and Medlin decisions represent an attempt to
impose structure and limitations on an acknowledged part of
plea bargaining-the informal, indirect, or even secret
knowledge of or participation by the trial judge in the plea bar-
gaining process. South Carolina now has a formal procedure for
trial judges to follow if they want to be involved in this process.
To echo the Medlin dissent, however, exactly what the court
adopted is unclear; the boundaries of these standards are un-
tested. In fact, by adopting only Standard 14-3.3, South Carolina
has isolated one part of an interelated set of principles. How
well this standard will function apart from the correlative stan-
dards for the defense counsel and the prosecutor is unknown. 9
Several questions remain unanswered even by the ABA
Standards. For instance, may statements of record at a plea bar-
gaining conference be used for impeachment purposes at trial if
the plea bargaining fails and the guilty plea is withdrawn?
Should a judge present at a plea bargaining conference in which
a proposed guilty plea is withdrawn excuse himself from sitting
on that case? Why must defense counsel and the prosecutor
agree on requesting a meeting with the judge? 00 Arguably, these
standards leave too much discretion with the trial judge instead
of requiring him to participate if both parties so request, and
requiring him to disclose the sentence before entry of a plea.101
With the Harden and Medlin decisions, South Carolina is in
the forefront of states that allow structured judicial participa-
tion in plea bargaining. The ABA Standards call for on-the-re-
cord and dispassionate judicial participation in plea negotia-
tion-a worthy objective. The use of these standards as rules of
court procedure in South Carolina will be followed closely by
other states, scholars, and the legal community.1 0 2 Because of
the strong dissent in Medlin and the untested nature of these
99. For instance, Standard 14-3.3(b)(i) states that in accepting the plea bargain, the
judge should order the preparation of a preplea or presentence report to aid him in de-
termining the appropriate disposition of the case. In another ABA Standard not adopted
in this decision, Standard 18-5.2, the defendant must consent to the preparation of the
presentence report.
100. See Lefstein, supra note 80, at 518-19.
101. Id. at 516-18.
102. Professor James F. Flanagan, of the University of South Carolina School of
Law, discussed the effects of the ABA Standards on judicial involvement in plea bargain-
ing in a S.C. Bar-C.L.E. treatise. J. FLANAGAN, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW
at 76-86 (October 2, 1981).
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19
Widener et al.: Criminal Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
standards, some trial judges may refuse to participate, or the su-
preme court may retreat from its newly adopted position. In
light of their worthy objectives and in spite of the unanswered
questions the standards raise, not giving the standards on judi-
cial participation in plea bargaining a fair trial themselves would
be unreasonable and unwarranted.
Susan 0. McNamee
III. HEARSAY TESTIMONY OFFERED BY STATE AT PRELIMINARY
HEARING
In State v. Thompson,103 the South Carolina Supreme
Court considered a myriad of overlapping constitutional and
procedural issues regarding the conduct of criminal proceedings.
The court held, in part,10 4 that probable cause may be based
solely on hearsay testimony offered by the State at a preliminary
hearing.105 This holding places South Carolina in the majority of
jurisdictions that have considered this issue,"°6 but raises ques-
tions about the usefulness and potential abuse of a preliminary
hearing at which only hearsay evidence is offered.
The appellant was arrested for armed robbery. At the pre-
liminary hearing attended by defense counsel,107 the State of-
fered only one witness, a police officer, who read the testimony
of an accomplice into the record. This statement was the only
103. - S.C. -, 281 S.E.2d 216 (1981).
104. The court also held: (1) a motion for mistrial based on the receipt of incompe-
tent evidence is properly refused when there exists overwhelming evidence against the
defendant and the trial court instructs the jury to disregard the testimony;, (2) evidence
properly admitted to demonstrate a defendant's attempt to avoid detection, apprehen-
sion, and identification may not be excluded merely because it incidentally reflects upon
the defendant's character; (3) a conversation between the defendant and a police officer
initiated by the defendant during which the officer gives answers not intended to elicit
an incriminating response does not constitute an impermissible interrogation; (4) the
withholding of a list of the State's witnesses does not deprive the defendant of a fair
trial; (5) absent a showing of "when, how often and under what circumstances the partic-
ular prosecutor had been responsible for striking members of a particular race," a jury
will not be quashed because the State exercises its preemptory strikes to remove mem-
bers of the defendant's race; and (6) an improper admission of in-court eyewitness iden-
tification can be harmless error when the identification is merely cumulative to indepen-
dent and overwhelming evidence of guilt. Id. at _ 281 S.E.2d at 218-20.
105. Id. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 220.
106. See infra notes 119-20.
107. - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 220.
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testimony offered against the appellant. The trial court subse-
quently convicted the appellant of armed robbery and the South
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed.
The appellant argued on appeal that the admission of the
accomplice's hearsay statement as the sole evidence of probable
cause deprived him of the right to cross-examination and discov-
ery of the State's witnesses, and thus denied him effective assis-
tance of counsel.'l 8 The supreme court rejected appellant's
claim, relying upon State v. Jones,09 in which the court ruled
that the chief investigating officer may read statements of ab-
sent witnesses into the record. 110 The court in Thompson noted,
however, that the officer in Jones offered direct testimony in ad-
dition to hearsay statements."' The court did not find this dis-
tinction significant and held that the lack of direct testimony
"would not change the results of Jones since the appellant was
apprised of the nature of the State's evidence. ' ' "," The court
thus implied that the use of hearsay as the sole evidence of
probable cause may be unacceptable when it does not ade-
quately inform the defendant of the State's case against him.
The scope of preliminary hearings in South Carolina is gov-
erned by section 22-5-320 of the South Carolina Code.113 The
108. Id. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 220.
109. 273 S.C. 723, 259 S.E.2d 120 (1979).
110. Id. at 726-27, 259 S.E.2d at 122.
111. - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 220.
112. Id. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 220.
113. S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-5-320 (Supp. 1980) provides:
Any magistrate who issues a warrant charging a crime beyond his jurisdiction
shall grant and hold a preliminary hearing of it upon the demand in writing of
the defendant made within twenty days of the hearing to set bond for such
charge; provided, however, that if such twenty-day period expires on a date
prior to the convening of the next term of General Sessions Court having juris-
diction then the defendant may wait to make such request until a date at least
ten days before the next term of General Sessions Court convenes. At the pre-
liminary hearing, the defendant may cross-examine the state's witnesses in
person or by counsel, have the reply in argument if there be counsel for the
State, and be heard in argument in person or by counsel as to whether a proba-
ble case has been made out and as to whether the case ought to be dismissed
by the magistrate and the defendant discharged without delay. When such a
hearing has been so demanded the case shall not be transmitted to the court of
general sessions or submitted to the grand jury until the preliminary hearing
shall have been had, the magistrate to retain jurisdiction and the court of gen-
eral sessions not to acquire jurisdiction until after such preliminary hearing.
Provided, however, that the defendant shall not be required to appear in per-
son at the appointed time, date and place set for the hearing if he is repre-
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preliminary hearing serves two purposes: first, an accused person
is entitled to a preliminary hearing in order to be apprised of the
nature of the State's evidence;114 and second, the hearing deter-
mines whether the State has probable cause of guilt.11 5 This
statute has not been interpreted to afford defendants significant
discovery of the State's case: "[Defendants] are not entitled to
expand the hearing into a discovery proceeding wherein they
may cross-examine all the State's witnesses, nor does the lan-
guage of Section 22-5-320 require the State to come forward
with all its witnesses and evidence at this stage." ' 6 Therefore,
the State need only produce enough evidence to establish proba-
ble cause 17 and hearsay evidence may be used to partially meet
this burden.118 The decision in Thompson goes further by al-
lowing a hearsay statement to be the only evidence of probable
cause.
The supreme court's decision that a finding of probable
cause may be based wholly on hearsay evidence is in accord with
both the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 9 and the practice
in most states. 20 The propriety of relying on hearsay evidence
has been questioned in the federal system, 21 however, and sev-
eral states have imposed decisional or statutory limitations on
its admissibility.122 New York, for example, prohibits the use of
hearsay evidence, including the recitation of investigational re-
ports at the preliminary hearing in felony cases.123 Arizona al-
sented by his attorney.
114. State v. Flood, 257 S.C. 141, 184 S.E.2d 549 (1971).
115. State v. White, 243 S.C. 238, 133 S.E.2d 320 (1963).
116. State v. Jones, 273 S.C. at 727, 259 S.E.2d at 122.
117. 2869 Op. Att'y Gen. 106 (1969-70).
118. 77-53 Op. Att'y Gen. 55 (1976-77).
119. "[Tjhe finding of probable cause may be based upon hearsay evidence in whole
or in part." FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a).
120. E.g., People v. McRae, 31 Cal. 2d 185, 187 P. 617, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 843
(1948); McIntyre v. Sands, 128 Kan. 52, 278 P. 761 (1929). See also Comment, Prelimi-
nary Examination-Evidence and Due Process, 15 U. KAN. L. REv. 374, 380-81 (1967).
121. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a) and the accompanying advisory notes.
122. People v. Beasley, 250 Cal. App. 2d 71, 58 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1967); People ex rel.
Van Meveren v. District Court, 195 Colo. 1, 575 P.2d 405 (1978); Maestas v. District
Court, 189 Colo. 443, 541 P.2d 889 (1975); People v. Bonilla, 74 Misc. 2d 971, 347 N.Y.S.
2d 130 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1973); Waugh v. State, 564 S.W.2d 654 (Tenn. 1978); Wolke v.
Fleming, 24 Wis. 2d 606, 129 N.W.2d 841 (1964).
123. People v. Bonilla, 74 Misc. 2d 971, 347 N.Y.S. 2d 130 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1973).
"These are self-serving records, created in part in the anticipation of legal proceed-
ings ...... Id. at 973, 347 N.Y.S. 2d at 133 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 34
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lows preliminary hearings to be based in whole or in part on
hearsay, but the testimony of witnesses concerning the declara-
tions of others is admissible only when there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the actual declarants will be available at
the trial.12' The Supreme Court of Colorado, perhaps the most
articulate court on this subject, has held that .
[H]earsay evidence is admissible at a preliminary hearing, but
we admonish the courts to be aware of the excessive use of
hearsay in the presentation of the government cases. The inor-
dinate use of hearsay ... foils the protective defense against
unwarranted prosecutions that preliminary hearings are
designed to afford to the innocent .... Better prosecutorial
practice entails the presentation of a residuum of competent,
non-hearsay evidence at the preliminary hearing to support
probable cause. 25
Since the unreliability of hearsay evidence is a major con-
cern, arguably from a policy standpoint evidence inadmissible at
trial should not be admitted at a preliminary hearing to estab-
lish probable cause.12 The court in Thompson, however, focused
on the preliminary hearing's function of apprising the defendant
of the State's evidence, concluding that if a defendant is in-
formed of the nature of the State's case, he has no ground to
challenge the form of the evidence.127 Consequently, although
the court did not set forth detailed, substantial limitations on
the use of hearsay testimony at preliminary hearings, the court
has at least required that the hearsay evidence be sufficiently
informative of the nature of the State's case.
Because questioning the court's position in Thompson is
difficult, in the future the court may want to consider whether
allowing proof of probable cause by only hearsay testimony im-
pairs the fairness and efficacy of a preliminary hearing beyond
the impact of the testimony on the defendant's ability to discern
the nature of the State's claim.
124. ARmz. R. CRIM. P. 5.4(c).
125. Maestas v. District Court, 189 Colo. 443, 447, 541 P.2d 889, 892 (1975).
126. Note, The Admissibility of Hearsay in Preliminary Examinations in Louisi-
ana, 36 LA. L. REv. 1050, 1053 (1976).
127. - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 220.
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IV. ASSISTANT SOLICITOR AS WITNESS BEFORE GRAND JURY
In State v. Capps,128 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that an assistant solicitor may appear as a witness before
the grand jury to provide a summary of the evidence in a case
which he had been assigned for prosecution 1 29 This approach
has been adopted by at least one other jurisdiction.130 The court
in Capps also reaffirmed the validity of indictments based en-
tirely on hearsay evidence. 1  On this issue, South Carolina
stands in agreement with a number of jurisdictions, including
the federal courts.
1 32
The appellant was convicted of assault and battery with in-
tent to kill and criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. At
the Greenville County grand jury hearing the assistant solicitor
appeared as a witness to present a summary of the evidence.
The State presented no other witnesses and the grand jury did
not request to hear other witnesses.133 The assistant solicitor did
not examine or cross-examine any witnesses before the grand
jury, nor did he participate in or present himself during the
128. 276 S.C. 59, 275 S.E.2d 872 (1981).
129. Id. at 62, 275 S.E.2d at 873.
130. People v. Bissonnette, 20 IlM. App. 3d 970, 973-74, 313 N.E.2d 646, 649.
131. 276 S.C. at 60-61, 275 S.E.2d at 872.
132. See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); United States v. Pay-
ton, 363 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 993 (1966); United States v.
Gramolini, 301 F. Supp. 39 (D.C.R.L 1969); People v. Jones, 19 Ill. 2d 37, 166 N.E.2d 1
(1960); People v. McCracken, 61 Il. App. 2d 457, 209 N.E.2d 673 (1965). See generally,
Annot., 4 A.L.R. 2d 392 (1949).
In South Carolina, this issue was decided in State v. Williams, 263 S.C. 290, 210
S.E.2d 298 (1974). In Williams, the supreme court held that an indictment based on
hearsay violated no right of the accused under S.C. CONST. art. I, § 11. 263 S.C. at 295-
96, 210 S.E.2d at 301. This section of the Constitution states: "[n]o person shall be held
to answer for any crime where the punishment exceeds a fine of two hundred dollars or
imprisonment for thirty days, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury.... " The court in Williams relied extensively on Costello v. United States, 350
U.S. 359 (1956), involving an indictment based upon the testimony of three investigating
officers with no firsthand knowledge of the facts. The United States Supreme Court con-
cluded that "[a]n indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury,
... if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits." Id. at 363.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has also held that the secrecy of grand jury
proceedings precludes any inquiry into the factual basis of indictments. Margolis v.
Telech, 239 S.C. 232, 241, 122 S.E.2d 417, 421 (1961). For a discussion of the secrecy of
grand jury deliberations, see State v. Rector, 158 S.C. 212, 155 S.E. 385 (1930).
133. Record at 16. Other witnesses would have bee4 subpoenaed and testimony
presented had the grand jury so requested. Id.
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grand jury deliberations.'" At trial, the appellant moved to
quash the indictment, arguing that the appearance by the solici-
tor improperly influenced the grand jury and violated the court's
previous holding in Ex parte McLeod. 3 5 The South Carolina
Supreme Court, with vigorous dissent by Chief Justice Lewis, af-
firmed the trial court's denial of the appellant's motion.
The supreme court noted that a solicitor has a right and
duty to communicate with the grand jury concerning the proce-
dural aspects of its hearings. 3 6 Extending this rule, the majority
reasoned that the grand jury's calling of an assistant solicitor "as
an investigating witness did not thereby render him legally in-
competent nor was it an improper attempt to influence the
grand jury. 13 7 The majority distinguished its earlier decision in
Ex Parte McLeod in which it had barred prosecutors from ex-
amining or cross-examining grand jury witnesses on the grounds
that the assistant solicitor in Capps appeared only as a witness,
not as a prosecutor. 3 8 The court specifically held that the only
capacity in which any person may be called before or attend a
grand jury session is that of a witness during the taking of his
testimony.18'
The majority in Capps cautioned that prosecutors appear-
ing as witnesses must avoid the appearance or reality of a con-
flict of interest and should appear as the sole witness only if
there is no other alternative.4 0 Prosecutors may only appear as
witnesses if they will not improperly influence the grand jury.14 '
The supreme court concluded that the assistant solicitor's ap-
pearance as a witness to summarize evidence did not improperly
influence the grand jury.
4'4
134. Id..
135. 272 S.C. 373, 252 S.E.2d 126 (1979).
136. 276 S.C. at 60, 275 S.E.2d at 872 (citing State v. McNinch, 12 S.C. 89 (1879)).
137. 276 S.C. at 61, 275 S.E.2d at 872-73 (citing People v. Bissonnette, 20 Ill. App.
3d 970, 313 N.E.2d 646 (1974)).
138. 276 S.C. at 62, 275 S.E.2d at 873.
139. Id. at 61, 275 S.E.2d at 873.
140. Id. at 61-62, 275 S.E.2d at 873. Chief Justice Lewis went further than the ma-
jority by advocating that: (1) an indictment may not be based solely on the testimony of
a solicitor; and (2) assuming the solicitor could act as a witness, an indictment should
not be routinely acquired solely on the basis of hearsay evidence. Id. at 64-65, 67, 275
S.E.2d at 874, 876 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 61, 275 S.E.2d at 872-73 (citing People v. Bissonnette, 20 M1. App. 3d 970,
313 N.E.2d 646 (1974)).
142. 276 S.C. at 62, 275 S.E.2d at 873.
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The Capps court also found that basing the grand jury's in-
dictment upon hearsay testimony of the assistant solicitor did
not thereby render it invalid. 14 3 This finding is consistent with
an earlier decision of the court"' and is the approach taken by
the United States Supreme Court.' 5
The majority and dissent in Capps present two views on the
role of the prosecutor in grand jury proceedings. The majority
apparently viewed the appearance of a prosecutor as a witness as
an aid to the grand jury's understanding of the case before it.,"'
The dissent, however, favored retreating from Ex parte McLeod
and allowing attorneys for the State to be present while the
grand jury is in session.1 7 Prosecutors would be allowed to ex-
amine and cross-examine witnesses, but would not be able to ap-
pear as witnesses because of the potential conflict in interest be-
tween these two roles. 148 Chief Justice Lewis argued that a
prosecutor has a duty to prosecute vigorously and cannot be an
objective witness. 49 He reagoned that the opportunity and
temptation to tailor testimony to the prosecution's needs is es-
pecially great when a experienced trial attorney takes the stand
for the prosecution. 50 Further, he considered the authoritative
credibility which surrounds a prosecutor and the need for pre-
serving the public trust in grand jury proceedings as additional
reasons to prohibit, except in rare cases, the appearance of a
prosecutor as a witness.'
The concerns expressed by Chief Justice Lewis in his dis-
sent in Capps are well-founded. The potential for a prosecutor
to tailor his testimony to favor indictment clearly exists. Fur-
ther, "[tihe roles of an advocate and of a witness are inconsis-
143. Id. at 62, 275 S.E.2d at 872.
144. State v. Williams, 263 S.C. 290, 210 S.E.2d 298 (1974).
145. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
146. This interpretation is consistent with the court's view that solicitors have a
"duty to communicate with the grand jury relative to the manner in which they conduct
their business and ... the appellant cannot claim prejudice by the mere fact evidence
was presented by the prosecution. 275 S.C. at 60-61, 276 S.E.2d at 872 (citing State v.
Bramlett, 166 S.C. 323, 164 S.E. 873 (1932); State v. McNinch, 12 S.C. 89 (1879)).
147. 276 S.C. at 65, 275 S.E.2d at 874.
148. Id. at 65, 275 S.E.2d at 874-75 (citing State v. Durden, 264 S.C. 86, 212 S.E.2d
587 (1975)).
149. Id. See also United States v. Treadway, 445 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
150. 276 S.C. at 66, 275 S.E.2d at 875 (quoting United States v. Alu, 246 F.2d 29, 33
(2d Cir. 1957)).
151. Id. at 66-67, 275 S.E.2d at 875.
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tent; the function of an advocate and of a witness are inconsis-
tent; the function of an advocate is to advance or argue the
cause of another, while that of a witness is to state facts objec-
tively."' 52 The majority apparently gave less weight to these con-
cerns. It chose instead to adopt a rule which may expedite the
grand jury process, but may ultimately produce some unjust re-
sults if prosecutors abuse the privilege extended to them in
Capps.
Prosecutors and practitioners should not assume that the
supreme court's decision in Capps gives the State an absolute
right to present its attorneys as witnesses. The majority's cave-
ats concerning the potential conflict of interest and use of a
prosecutor as a sole witness indicate that the court will not look
favorably upon overuse of this privilege. Further, Chief Justice
Lewis' strong dissent suggests that the holding in Capps may be
narrowly interpreted or modified when this issue is again
presented to the supreme court.
Randall H. Johnson
V. COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL EXAMINATION AND HEARING
In State v. Blair,53 the South Carolina Supreme Court clar-
ified the statutory procedure for an examination and hearing on
the issue of competency to stand trial. The court held that the
criminal defendant's failure to request a competency hearing did
not waive his right to such a hearing when the defendant had a
history of mental illness and had previously been judged incom-
petent to stand trial for the same offense.'"
The defendant was charged with fatally shooting his grand-
mother in October 1977. In accordance with section 44-23-410 of
the South Carolina Code,155 the court committed the defendant
152. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmmrrY EC 5-9 (1978).
153. 275 S.C. 529, 273 S.E.2d 536 (1981).
154. Id. at 532-33, 273 S.E.2d at 538.
155. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-410 (1976) provides:
Whenever a judge of the circuit court, county court, or family court has
reason to believe that a person on trial before him, charged with the commis-
sion of a criminal offense, is not fit to stand trial because such person lacks the
capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own de-
fense as a result of lack of mental capacity, the judge shall:
(1) Order examination of such person by two examiners designated
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to the state mental facilities for examination and observation to
determine his fitness to stand trial.156 He was found incompetent
to stand trial in January 1978. In June 1978, however, after a
probate sanity hearing, the defendant was determined to be no
longer mentally ill and was returned to General Sessions Court
jurisdiction. The circuit court judge ordered another competency
examination in August 1979, and the report of the Department
of Mental Health in November 1979 concluded that the defen-
dant was schizophrenic but capable of standing trial.15" 7 Al-
though the South Carolina Code provides that competency ex-
aminations are to be followed by an examiner's report 58 and a
hearing on fitness to stand trial, 59 neither party requested, and
the court did not order a hearing following the November 1979
examiner's report. Because insanity was the defendant's sole de-
fense at his January 1980 trial,1 60 he was convicted. He appealed
the trial court's failure to conduct the competency hearing prior
to the trial.
On appeal, the State argued that defendant had waived his
right to a competency hearing by not requesting one and by fail-
ing to raise a timely objection to stop proceedings until a hear-
by the Department of Mental Health or the Mental Retardation Depart-
ment or both; such examination shall be made within fifteen days after
the court's order, or
(2) Order such person committed for examination and observation
to an appropriate facility for a period not to exceed fifteen days....
The report of such examination shall be admissible as evidence in subse-
quent hearings pursuant to § 44-23-430....
The South Carolina statutory guidelines for determining competency to stand trial
resemble the federal guidelines set forth in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402
(1960)(per curiam), which are "'whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether
he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."' Id.
156. Brief for Appellant at 2.
157. Id.
158. S.C. CorE ANN. § 44-23-420 (1976).
159. In pertinent part, S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-430 (1976) provides:
Upon receiving the report of the designated examiners the court shall set a
date for and notify the person and his counsel of a hearing on the issue of his
fitness to stand trial. The person shall be entitled to be present at such hearing
and to be represented by counsel.
160. 275 S.C. at 532, 273 S.E.2d at 537. Competency to stand trial should not be
confused with a defendant's plea of insanity during the commission of the crime. Compe-
tency is concerned with the defendant's mental condition at the time of trial and deals
with his ability to participate in the judicial proceedings and not with his responsibility
for the criminal act. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 39 (1972).
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ing was ordered.181 The South Carolina Supreme Court, how-
ever, upheld the defendant's procedural due process rights by
strictly construing the pertinent provisions of the South Caro-
lina Code.18 2 Focusing on the language "[u]pon receiving the re-
port... the court shall set a date for . . . a hearing,' '1 3" the
court held that the word "shall" must be regarded as mandatory
when the duty to which "shall" relates involves the protection of
an individual's right-here the right to a fair trial'"
In reaching its decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court
relied on two decisions by the United States Supreme Court,
Pate v. Robinson6 5 and Drope v. Missouri.e16 In Pate, the Court
held that a defendant does not waive his right to a competency
hearing by failing to request the hearing if the evidence in the
case is sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt concerning the defen-
dant's competence to stand trial.167 Drope clarified the eviden-
tiary standards a court should use in deciding whether to order a
competency examination and hearing for a defendant.
"[E]vidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, his demeanor
at trial, and prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial
are all relevant in determining whether further inquiry is re-
quired, but.., even one of these factors standing alone may, in
some circumstances, be sufficient."168
In Blair, the defendant's mental history and the past adju-
dication of his incompetence to stand trial coupled with the
mandatory wording of the South Carolina statute persuaded the
court to remand Blair for a competency hearing.16' If this hear-
ing reveals that the defendant was competent at his trial in Jan-
uary 1980, the conviction will stand.1 70 If, however, the nunc pro
tunc hearing171 reveals that defendant was incompetent at that
161. Brief for Respondent at 1.
162. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-23-410 to -430 (1976).
163. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 44-23-430 (1976).
164. 275 S.C. at 532, 273 S.E.2d at 538.
165. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
166. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
167. 383 U.S. at 384-85.
168. 420 U.S. at 180.
169. 275 S.C. at 534, 273 S.E.2d at 538.
170. Id.
171. Nunc pro tune signifies a thing done now which has the same legal force and
effect as if done at the time when it ought to have been done. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
964 (5th ed. 1979).
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date to stand trial, an order reversing the conviction will be en-
tered, and a new trial will be granted when he becomes compe-
tent to stand trial. 17 2 The court based this retrospective remand
procedure on State v. Hamilton 13 and State v. Cannon.174
These cases were remanded by the court for nunc pro tunc hear-
ings on the respective issues of probable cause for an arrest and
the voluntariness of a defendant's confession. In both Hamil-
tonI75 and Cannon,7 6 the court found that the defendant suf-
fered no actual prejudice because of the retrospective
determination.
Blair clearly establishes that once a competency examina-
tion is ordered, a hearing must follow. The court's remand of the
case to determine retrospectively the defendant's competency at
his earlier trial, however, does not appear to be consistent with
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. In Pate177
and Drope,7 18 the Court suggested that because "[t]he jury
would not be able to observe the subject of their inquiry, and
expert witnesses would be required to testify solely from infor-
mation contained in the printed record,' 7 9 retrospective deter-
mination of defendant's competency to stand trial may not ade-
quately protect the defendant's due process rights.18 0 The court
in Pate also noted that the need for concurrent determination of
competency to stand trial at the time of the trial and not years
later distinguishes a competency hearing from a separate re-
172. 275 S.C. at 534, 273 S.E.2d at 538.
173. 251 S.C. 1, 159 S.E.2d 607 (1968).
174. 248 S.C. 506, 151 S.E.2d 752 (1966). Cannon followed Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368 (1964), which required that the voluntariness of the confession be determined
by a tribunal other than the jury charged with initially deciding guilt or innocence.
175. 251 S.C. at 5, 159 S.E.2d at 609.
176. 248 S.C. at 515, 151 S.E.2d at 756.
177. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
178. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
179. 383 U.S. at 387.
180. 420 U.S. at 183. But see Bruce v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1976), in
which the court noted that a nunc pro tunc competency hearing does not per se preclude
intelligent retrospective resolution of the competency issue if there is a sufficient quanti-
ty and quality of nonconflicting evidence and testimony available. In Bruce, the court
overturned the finding of a retrospective competency hearing held nine years after the
trial because the value of the transcript as evidence had to be discounted; it could not
reflect tone, demeanor, inflections of speech and other indicia of mental state and the
opinions of attorneys and medical experts regarding the defendant's competency were
irreconcilable. See also Silten and Tullis, Mental Competency in Criminal Proceedings,
28 HASTINGS L.J. 1052 (1977).
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mand hearing on the voluntariness of a confession.181 In Dusky
v. United States,82 the Court indicated that the proper proce-
dure for competency determinations is to remand the case for a
new hearing to ascertain a defendant's present competency to
stand trial; if the defendant is found presently competent, a new
trial will be granted.
1 83
Thus, although the court in Blair recognized that due pro-
cess rights attach to competency to stand trial examinations and
hearings, the court may have incorrectly defined the scope of
these rights. The United States Supreme Court has suggested
that nunc pro tunc procedures for determining competency such
as those employed in Blair offer inadequate protection of a de-
fendant's rights.18 4 Blair, therefore, leaves open the substantial
question of whether the court has sufficiently protected the de-
fendant's constitutional right to a trial in which he is capable of
understanding the proceedings against him and of assisting in
his own defense.
Susan 0. McNamee
VI. MODIFYING THE COMMON LAW DEFINITION OF BURGLARY
South Carolina has long accepted and applied the common
law definition of burglary: breaking and entering the dwelling
house of another in the nighttime with the intent to commit a
felony therein.'85 In State v. Brooks,16 the South Carolina Su-
preme Court held that, given the existence of the other essential
elements, the intent to commit any crime, whether felony or
misdemeanor, is sufficient to establish burglary. In so doing, the
181. 383 U.S. at 387 (citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)).
182. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
183. Id. at 403.
184. As the Supreme Court stated in Drope:
[g]iven the inherent difficulties of such a nunc pro tunc determination under
the most favorable circumstances, [citation omitted] we cannot conclude that
such a procedure would be adequate here [citation omitted]. The State is free
to retry petitioner, assuming, of course, that at the time of such .trial he is
competent to be tried.
420 U.S. at 183.
185. State v. Clamp, 225 S.C. 89, 80 S.E.2d 918 (1954); State v. Clary, 24 S.C. 116
(1885); State v. Sampson, 12 S.C. 567 (1879); State v. Ginns, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.)
583 (1819).
186. - S.C. -, 283 S.E.2d 830 (1981).
1982]
31
Widener et al.: Criminal Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
court joined a substantial number of other jurisdictions that
have similarly altered this element."' 7 However, in contrast to
the lighter sentences imposed by other jurisdictions,188 South
Carolina's burglary statute still mandates life imprisonment ab-
sent a jury recommendation for mercy. 189
In Brooks, the defendant was convicted of burglary, crimi-
nal sexual conduct, and larceny. He appealed the burglary con-
viction on two grounds: first, that there was no evidence of a
187. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.310(a) (1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-203
(1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.02 (Harrison 1981); HAWAI REv. STAT. § 708-810 (1976);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 401 (Supp. 1981). Some jurisdictions have also elimi-
nated the requirement that there be a breaking. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
102 (West 1958); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:1 (1974); N.D. CENr. CODE § 12.1-22-02
(1976).
188. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(d) (1980)(not more than 10 years); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-35a (West Supp. 1981)(1 to 10 years); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4205
(1979)(2 to 20 years); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 22-1801 (West Supp. 1970)(5 to 30 years);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082(3)(C) (Harrison 1981)(not more than 15 years).
189. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-310 (1976) provides:
Any person who shall commit the crime of burglary at common law shall, upon
conviction, be imprisoned in the State Penitentiary at hard labor, during the
whole lifetime of the prisoner; provided, however, that when a prisoner is
found guilty the jury may find a special verdict, recommending him to the
mercy of the court, whereupon the punishment shall be reduced to imprison-
ment in the Penitentiary at hard labor for a term of not less than five years.
Although no other jurisdiction imposes a mandatory life sentence for burglary, a life
sentence is optional in a few jurisdictions. E.g., AL. Con § 13A-5-6 (1977)(10 to 99
years or life); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 14 (West 1970)(life or not less than 10
years); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-8-1 (1969)(life or not less than 5 years); Tax. PENAL CODE
ANN. tit. 3, § 12.32 (Vernon Supp. 1982)(life or not more than 99 years or less than 5
years).
Most jurisdictions that provide a possible life sentence for burglary require aggra-
vating circumstances before that sentence can be imposed. E.g., MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 266, § 14 (West 1970)(requires that: (1) the burglar be armed with a dangerous
weapon or that he assault another, (2) he intend to commit a felony, and (3) the dwelling
be occupied at the time of the burglary); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1203 (1974)(the build-
ing must be occupied at the time as a sleeping apartment and the burglar must "inten[d]
to commit murder, rape, robbery, larceny, or other felony"); VA. CODE § 18.2-89
(1950)(the burglar must be armed with a deadly weapon and intend to commit a felony
or larceny).
Of all the jurisdictions which allow life sentences for burglary, Texas has the
broadest definition of burglary. Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 30.02 (Vernon 1974). The
statute does not require that there be a breaking or that the burglary be committed at
night. The premises burglarized must be a habitation or a building, but the term habita-
tion encompasses vehicles adapted for overnight accommodation as well as garages and
other outbuildings. Id. § 30.01. If the premises is not a habitation, a burglar may still be
sentenced to life if he is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon, or if he injures or
attempts to injure another. Id. § 30.02.
32
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol34/iss1/8
CRIMINAL LAW
breaking, and second, that the indictment was insufficient on its
face because it did not specify the felony he allegedly intended
to commit. 90 The court first found that a reversal was required
because the State failed to present any proof of a breaking.1 91
The supreme court then considered the second ground of appeal
and modified the common law by replacing the element of felo-
nious intent with criminal intent.""2
The court based its holding in Brooks on its view of bur-
glary as a crime against the security of the home, rather than
simply a crime against a person's property. 93 The supreme court
reasoned that one who breaks into a house at night intending to
commit petit larceny, a misdemeanor,'" threatens its occupants'
security as seriously as one intending to commit grand larceny, a
felony.1 95 The court found that the dollar value of the goods in-
tended to be stolen was irrelevant.198
The supreme court's decision in Brooks to eliminate the
common law requirement of intent to commit a felony in bur-
glary actions probably was unnecessary. The same result could
have been reached under present law without altering the defini-
tion of burglary. In South Carolina, "privily entering and steal-
ing from any house, in the nighttime or daytime" is grand lar-
190. The court never addressed the question of whether the indictment was insuffi-
cient because it did not specify the felony the defendant intended to commit. This leaves
open the question of whether an indictment must now name the specific crime a defen-
dant intended to commit. In a well-reasoned dissent, Chief Justice Lewis indicated that a
burglary indictment that does not specify the intended felony is not sufficient and must
be quashed. See - S.C. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 832.
191. Id. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 831. The court noted that there is no evidence stating
that the windows or doors were closed or how the appellant gained entry into the dwell-
ing house. While it is ludicrous to assume appellant was invited to enter the residence
and commit this crime upon an unsuspecting victim, the law of this State requires some
proof of a "breaking."
192. Id. The court rather tardily followed this declaration with the statement that
"[n]o further exceptions need be considered since the conviction has been reversed for
lack of evidence." Id.
193. State v. Brooks, - S.C. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 831 (1981); State v. Clamp, 225
S.C. at 102, 80 S.E.2d at 924 (1954); State v. Ginns, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) at 584-85
(1819).
194. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-30 (1976).
195. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-10 (1976).
196. - S.C. at , 283 S.E.2d at 831. The General Assembly has amended the
petit larceny statute, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-30 (1976), to include any simple larceny of
goods worth less than $200 (increased from $50). 1981 S.C. Acts No. 76 § 4.
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ceny,197 regardless of the value of the good stolen. Consequently,
one who privily steals from a house commits a felony and the
intent to do so provides the requisite intent for common
burglary."9 8
Previously, the court has ignored the difference in grand
and petit larceny in a case involving a burglary. In State v. Lam-
bert,"'9 the defendant stole an "item"2 00 and was convicted of
burglary. On appeal, the court found sufficient evidence of felo-
nious intent, although the only intent recognized was to "enter
and steal, '20 1 with no reference to the value of the item stolen.
The court ignored the distinction between a felony and a misde-
meanor in Lambert, and, thus, need not have considered the dis-
tinction in Brooks.
Although eliminating the element of felonious intent in
Brooks was unnecessary, the court's action is consistent with its
view of burglary as a breach of the home's security. The safety
of one whose home has been broken into is threatened equally
regardless of whether the intruder intends to steal a valuable
item, an inexpensive item, or nothing at all. Nevertheless, there
are compelling reasons why any changes in the definition of bur-
glary should have been made by the legislature, rather than the
court.
First, the supreme court's decision in Brooks redefined the
crime of burglary with no apparent reference to the penalty pre-
viously imposed by the legislature. The legislature apparently
considered a burglar's felonious intent as justifying the harsh
penalty of life imprisonment. 02 Comparing the burglary statute
with the breaking and entering statute reinforces this assump-
tion.203 The breaking and entering statute eliminates some of the
elements of the common law crime and provides penalties of on-
197. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-20 (1976).
198. Although the definitions of burglary and privily stealing are quite similar, the
penalty for the latter is only three months to ten years. State v. Huffstetler, 213 S.C. 319,
49 S.E.2d 585 (1948); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-20 (1976).
199. 266 S.C. 574, 225 S.E.2d 340 (1976).
200. Id. at 579, 225 S.E.2d at 342. The "item" was a piece of ladies' underwear.
Record at 8.
201. 266 S.C. 574, 225 S.E.2d 340 (1976).
202. "[I]t is to be presumed that no change in the common law was intended by any
statute unless the language employed clearly indicates such intention." Coakley v. Tide-
water Constr. Corp., 194 S.C. 284, 287, 9 S.E.2d 724, 726 (1940).
203. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-320 (Supp. 1980).
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ly five or ten years imprisonment.2 °' The reduced penalties sug-
gest that the legislature would have reduced the penalty for bur-
glary had it chosen to statutorily eliminate or modify the
requirement of felonious intent.
A second reason for leaving the alteration of the definition
of burglary to the legislature is that a legislative rather than ju-
dicial redefinition might have avoided some unjust results that
are now possible. Presently no requirement exists that a trial
judge instruct the jury that it "may find a special verdict recom-
mending [the convicted defendant] to the mercy of the court."20 5
Thus, absent a recommendation of mercy, anything less than a
life sentence is illegal, °0 even when the burglar had no intent to
commit a serious crime within the dwelling. Furthermore, a de-
fendant who pleads guilty to burglary may be sentenced to life
imprisonment,207 even though he lacked an intent to commit a
felony within the dwelling. The judge is not required to equate a
guilty plea with a recommendation of mercy 2 8 and if he does
not, of course, a life sentence is mandatory. 20 9
Finally, a legislative rather than judicial alteration of the
common law is more appropriate in view of the court's recent
conclusion that the common law can be changed only by "clear
204. Subsection (1) eliminates the requirement that the breaking and entering of
the dwelling house be in the nighttime and reduces the requisite intent to that "to com-
mit a felony or crime of a lesser grade." The punishment for this form of breaking and
entering cannot exceed ten years imprisonment. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-320(1) (Supp.
1980).
Subsection (2) eliminates the requirement of any criminal intent upon entering any
house, other than a dwelling, in the daytime. This subsection also makes it a felony to
break and enter any house, other than a dwelling, in the nighttime with "intent to com-
mit a felony or crime of a lesser grade." The punishment for this form of breaking and
entering cannot exceed five years. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-320(2)(Supp. 1980).
205. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-310 (1976). It is error to refuse to so instruct the jury
when requested. State v. McGee, 268 S.C. 618, 235 S.E.2d 715 (1977).
206. McGee, 268 S.C. 618, 235 S.E.2d 715. Where a jury has recommended mercy, a
sentence of 30 years has been held to be too severe. State v. Kimbrough, 212 S.C. 348, 46
S.E.2d 273 (1948).
207. See Criminger v. State, 274 S.C. 241, 262 S.E.2d 734 (1980).
208. Id. at 242-43, 262 S.E.2d at 735. Defendant Criminger had argued that al-
though S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-130 (1976), requiring that a guilty plea be received as if
there had been a recommendation of mercy, had been declared unconstitutional in death
penalty cases, it remained applicable to cases that could result in life imprisonment. The
court disagreed, ruling that the state statute was unconstitutional in all cases.
209. State v. McGee, 268 S.C. 618, 235 S.E.2d 715 (1977).
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and unambiguous legislative enactment. ' 210 Although this state-
ment by the court has been criticized, 211 it remains as an indica-
tion of the court's previously held position on the issue.
The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Brooks to
modify the common law definition of burglary is not, standing
alone, a particularly startling decision. Yet, when this new defi-
nition is coupled with the statutory punishment for burglary,
the result may be extremely harsh. The General Assembly must
review this possibility and eliminate the mandatory life sentence
or restructure the burglary statute entirely, providing for gradu-
ated degrees of the crime with commensurate penalties.
Laura Callaway Hart
VII. FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A. Prison Escapees
In State v. Hiott,2 2 the South Carolina Supreme Court ap-
plied the legitimate expectation of privacy doctrine to determine
whether two prison escapees could challenge the propriety of a
search and seizure. The court held that the escapees had surren-
dered any legitimate expectation of privacy and thus could not
assert a violation of their fourth amendment rights.13 Applica-
tion of the legitimate expectation of privacy standard is consis-
tent with the approach currently taken by the United States Su-
preme Court in search and seizure cases.214 The South Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in Hiott, however, leaves unanswered
the extent to which prisoners retain any fourth amendment
rights and whether the forfeiture of a legitimate expectation of
210. State v. Carson, 274 S.C. 316, 319, 262 S.E.2d 918, 920 (1980). Only one of the
three legal authorities cited in Brooks as giving the court power to modify the common
law actually stands for this proposition-15A AM. Jun. 2D, Common Law, § 16 (1976).
The second authority cited, State v. Clamp, 225 S.C. 89, 80 S.E.2d 918 (1954) neither
modified nor held that the court had the power to modify the common law. The final
cited authority, State v. Sampson, 12 S.C. 567 (1879), merely discussed a statute which
had enlarged the meaning of "dwelling house" as the definition was used in burglary
cases.
211. See Criminal Law, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 33 S.C.L. REv. 53,
67 n.84 (1981).
212. 276 S.C. 72, 276 S.E.2d 163 (1981).
213. Id. at 77, 276 S.E.2d at 165.
214. See infra note 220.
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privacy applies to all prisoners, or only escapees.
Prisoners Hiott and Ruff escaped from Wateree Correc-
tional Institution and attempted to rob John Wates Pharmacy
in Columbia. During the robbery attempt, a pharmacist was shot
and killed. Four days later, police were called to the residence of
Ruff's girlfriend where they saw Ruff leaving the home. The po-
lice entered the house to search for Hiott2 15 and observed drugs
lying in open view on a table. An officer was then sent to obtain
a search warrant and a revolver was discovered during the sub-
sequent search. At trial, both the revolver and drugs were intro-
duced as evidence against Hiott and Ruff2 1 who were both even-
tually convicted of murder, attempted robbery, and conspiracy.
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the
convictions.
Appellants argued on appeal that the entry and subsequent
search of the residence violated their fourth amendment
rights.21 The supreme court refused to analyze the substance of
this argument, holding that Hiott and Ruff did not have a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy subject to protection under the
fourth amendment.2 8 The court also found that the escapees
could not legitimately be on any premises other than a prison
and thus were not entitled to challenge the search and seizure at
the home of Ruff's girlfriend.2 9 The court noted in conclusion
215. Unknown to the police, Hiott had accompanied Ruff. Both men were later ar-
rested at a convenience store. 276 S.C. at 75, 276 S.E.2d at 265.
216. Brief for Respondents at vi-vii.
217. 276 S.C. at 76, 276 S.E.2d at 165. Appellants also alleged the trial judge erred
in admitting the drugs and gun, permitting the jury to pass upon the charge of at-
tempted armed robbery, upholding a lineup procedure, and allowing an in-court inden-
tification. Id. The court found all exceptions to be without merit. Id. at 86, 276 S.E.2d at
170.
218. Id. at 77, 276 S.E.2d at 165.
219. Id. at 77, 276 S.E.2d at 165-66. The legitimately on the premises doctrine was
first announced and applied in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). This doctrine
denies an accused who was wrongfully on a premises the right to challenge evidence
discovered during a search of the premises. The doctrine apparently was discarded in
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978), in favor of an approach examining whether
the accused had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. The Supreme
Court, however, recently may have revived the legitimately on the premises doctrine to a
limited extent in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). In a concurring opinion in
Rawlings, Justice Blackmun concluded that "property interests" may still be "weighty
factors in establishing Fourth Amendment Rights," and that " 'the right to exclude'
often may be a principal determinant in the establishment of a legitimate Fourth
Amendment interest." Id. at 112 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Thus, Rawlings suggests
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that "[o]nce the defendants had escaped from prison, they aban-
doned their only legitimate premises and surrendered any future
legitimate expectation of privacy."220
The legitimate expectation of privacy standard is the ap-
proach currently taken by the United States Supreme Court to
determine if an accused has the right to challenge the constitu-
tionality of a search and seizure.221 The standard is subjective,
requiring courts to determine, based on the particular facts
before it, whether the accused had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the area searched. While the South Carolina Supreme
Court correctly applied this standard in Hiott, it also sought to
revive the legitimately on the premises standard. The United
States Supreme Court, however, appears to have rejected this
approach because of its difficulty in application.222
The court's decision in Hiott does not provide a clear indi-
cation of whether the forfeiture of a legitimate expectation of
privacy applies to only escapees, or to all prisoners. There is lan-
guage early in the court's opinion which suggests that only es-
capees forfeit this right.223 Further, the court later speaks of es-
capees surrendering their legitimate expectations of privacy,
thus implying that they had such rights while prisoners.224 How-
ever, .the court also quotes a Mississippi Supreme Court deci-
sion, Robinson v. State,225 in support of its decision in Hiott.
The quoted passage states that "Appellant's Fourth Amendment
that whether the accused was legitimately on the premises will be considered in deter-
mining the existence of a legitimate expectation of privacy.
220. 276 S.C. at 77, 276 S.E.2d at 165-66.
221. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1 (1976); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). The Supreme Court first
expressed the legitimate expectation of privacy doctrine in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967). An accused may challenge a search or seizure only if he had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the premises searched. The Katz court defined legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in terms of whether the accused exhibited an actual expectation of
privacy and whether this expectation was one which society recognizes as reasonable. 389
U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
222. See supra note 219.
223. The court stated that "we hold at the outset that the defendants-escapees were
not protected by the Fourth Amendment in this case." 276 S.C. at 76, 276 S.E.2d at 165.
A very narrow reading of this holding could limit it to the particular escapees in Hiott.
224. The supreme court noted that "fo]nce defendants had escaped unlawfully from
prison, they. . . surrendered any future legitimate expectation of privacy." 276 S.C. at
77, 276 S.E.2d at 165-66 (footnote omitted).
225. 312 So. 2d 15 (Miss. 1975).
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rights were no greater while he was an escapee than they were
while he was a prisoner . .. [;][h]e had lost his constitutional
protection against the invasion of his privacy."2 ' This quotation
appears to deny all prisoners any legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy.2 7 Thus, the Hiott decision does not provide a clear rule as
to those defendants who will be able to assert a violation of this
right, and those who will not.
The Hiott court also declined the opportunity to state the
extent to which prisoners or escapees forfeit their fourth amend-
ment rights. This cautious approach is understandable, since
there is little precedent to guide courts in this area. The United
States Supreme Court has not held specifically that a prisoner
retains his fourth amendment rights, but has recognized other
constitutional protections for prisoners.2 2 The Supreme Court
has implied, however, that prisoners do retain at least dimin-
ished fourth amendment rights.2 9 Lower federal courts have
gone further, expressly recognizing the existence of these rights
and their necessity in protecting the prisoner against abusive or
intrusive conduct.2
30
Although the court in Hiott did not define the scope of
fourth amendment protection for prisoners, it did provide some
226. 276 S.C. at 78, 276 S.E.2d at 176 (quoting Robinson v. State, 312 So. 2d 15, 18
(Miss. 1975)).
227. But see infra notes 232-60 and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (due process); Cruz v. Beto,
405 U.S. 319 (1972)(freedom of religion); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968)(equal
protection).
229. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), the court assumed that prisoners retain
some fourth amendment rights to reach the question of the reasonableness of a search
and seizure. Id. at 556-57. Further, in Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962), the Su-
preme Court stated:
Yet, without attempting either to define or to predict the ultimate scope of
Fourth Amendment protection, it is obvious that a jail shares none of the at-
tributes of privacy of a home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel room. In
prison, official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day. Though
it may be assumed that even in a jail, or perhaps especially there, the relation-
ships which the law has endowed with particularized confidentiality must con-
tinue to receive unceasing protection.
Id. at 143-44. Thus, while the Supreme Court has avoided a direct holding on point,
there is some recognition of a diminished right to privacy of prisoners.
230. See, e.g., United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1978); Bonner v.
Caughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975). In Bonner, the court held that "a prisoner en-
joys the protection of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches, at least to
some minimal extent." 517 F.2d at 1317.
1982] 105
39
Widener et al.: Criminal Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIw[
indication of how future cases may be decided. The court noted
that appellants, as prisoners, "had only severely diminished
rights."'23 1 Practitioners should be aware that the South Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in Hiott will likely deny escapee's any
legitimate expectation of privacy under the fourth amendment.
A broad reading of this case could also result in all prisoners
being denied this right. Although the court recognized that pris-
oners do retain certain constitutional rights, its decision in Hiott
implies that these rights are only minimal.
B. Probationers
In State v. Franks,232 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that probation officers did not violate probationers' fourth
amendment rights by issuing arrest warrants for the probation-
ers pursuant to section 24-21-450 of the South Carolina Code.23
More importantly, by allowing probationers to object to the issu-
ance of a warrant, the court recognized a right, though dimin-
ished, of probationers to fourth amendment protection from un-
reasonable invasions of privacy. Since the court considers a
probationer to be "still in custody because he faces significant
confinement and restraint even though he is [not] within the
four walls of a prison, 23 4 the decision may be a significant step
toward recognizing prisoners' constitutional rights.
On February 26, 1979, Stanley L. Franks was sentenced to
five years imprisonment for attempted housebreaking with in-
231. 276 S.C. at 77, 276 S.E.2d at 165.
232. - S.C. -, 281 S.E.2d 227 (1981).
233. S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-450 (1976). In pertinent part, the statute provides:
At any time during the period of probation or suspension of sentence the court,
or the court within the venue of which the violation occurs, may issue or cause
the issuing of a warrant and cause the defendant to be arrested for violating
any of the conditions of probation or suspension of sentence. Any police officer
or other officer with power of arrest, upon the request of the probation officer,
may arrest a probationer. In case of an arrest the arresting officer shall have
a written warrant from the probation officer setting forth that the probationer
has, in his judgment, violated the conditions of probation and such statement
shall be warrant for the detention of such probationer in the county jail or
other appropriate place of detention. ...
Id. (emphasis added). Other states have similar statutes which allow probation officers to
have probationers arrested. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2713 (1978).
234. - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 228 (citing Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236
(1963)).
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tent to commit a crime. The sentence was suspended upon ser-
vice of one year in prison and four years probation, and he was
released on probation on October 1, 1979. On February 11, 1980,
a probation officer issued an arrest warrant for Franks, charging
him with various violations of his probation conditions including
conviction for drunk and reckless driving. At the probation revo-
cation hearing, the hearing officer denied Franks' motion to dis-
miss the warrant on the ground that it was not issued by a neu-
tral and detached magistrate, as required by the fourth
amendment, and entered a revocation order.2 5 On appeal, the
supreme court affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss.23 6
Franks argued on appeal that section 24-21-450 could be in-
terpreted one of two ways: (1) only a court could issue an arrest
warrant for a probationer; or (2) either a court or a probation
officer could issue an arrest warrant for a probationer. Since a
warrant must be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate,
and a probation officer is not a magistrate, Franks maintained
that only the first interpretation was constitutional.2 3
In reaching its decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court
applied a two-step analysis. First, the court concluded that a
probation revocation proceeding is not a criminal trial but rather
an "informal proceeding with respect to notice and proof of the
alleged violations," since no additional punishment can be in-
voked other than a forfeiture of the "act of grace extended and
reimposition of the unserved portion of the original sentence. '238
Thus, the rights of a probationer in a probation revocation hear-
ing are not the same as those extended him by the Constitution
upon the trial of the original offense. The court further deter-
mined that probationers are in fact prisoners, though not con-
fined within the "four walls of a prison," and as such do "not
enjoy the same unfettered constitutional privileges available to
those not so confined."23' Based on the view of the diminished
235. - S.C: at -, 281 S.E.2d at 227-28.
236. Id. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 228.
237. Brief for Appellant at 2-9.
238. - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 228.
239. Id. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 228. In Franks, the South Carolina Supreme Court
extended the determination in Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242-243 (1963), that
parolees are still in custody to include probationers. Although there are some minor dif-
ferences between probation and parole, the United States Supreme Court in Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973), recognized that constitutionally the two are indistin-
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constitutional rights of probationers as stemming from the na-
ture of the proceeding and the status of probationers as prison-
ers, the court concluded that "the probationer's rights are ade-
quately protected by the requirement that his arrest for a
probation violation charge be preceded by the issuance of a war-
rant from the court or a probation officer as provided by section
24-21-450. ' '2M4 The court thus affirmed the constitutionality of
the interpretation of section 24-21-450 that allows either a court
or a probation officer to issue an arrest warrant for a
probationer.
The fourth amendment recognizes "[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches
and seizures. ... 241 The United States Supreme Court has de-
termined that in order to protect people from unreasonable
searches and seizures, arrest warrants must be issued by neutral
and detached magistrates.24 2 The Court's enforcement of the
fourth amendment is not the same for prisoners as it is for other
citizens, however, for what would be an unreasonable search and
seizure for other citizens could be reasonable for a prisoner.243
Since a probationer is considered a prisoner,24 4 the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court looked beyond the "neutral, detached mag-
istrate" standard set for the arrest of citizens in general and con-
cluded that the arrest standard of section 24-21-450 is
reasonable for the arrest of probationers. The requirement that
the probation officer be able to state that "in his judgment, the
guishable for revocation purposes. Thus, the extension of the Jones view of parolees to
include probationers is logical and constitutionally sound.
240. - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 228.
241. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. These same protections are also found in Art. I, § 10 of
the South Carolina Constitution.
242. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1970); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1947). In determining the validity of a warrantless
search in Johnson, the Court stated:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual infer-
ences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in re-
quiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enter-
prise of ferreting out crime.
333 U.S. at 13-14 (emphasis added).
243. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 556-57 (1979); Lanza v. New York, 370
U.S. 139, 143-44 (1962); Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1919).
244. - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 228. See supra note 239.
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probationer has violated the conditions of probation . . .
provides adequate protection from arbitrary and unreasonable
invasion of a probationer's privacy.
Franks is also consistent with United States Supreme Court
decisions on the due process requirements of probation revoca-
tion. In Morrissey v. Brewer,4 e the United States Supreme
Court set forth minimal due process requirements for parole rev-
ocation and in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,247 the Court extended the
same due process requirements to probation revocation. Both
cases recognized that "[t]he first stage [of revocation] occurs
when the parolee [probationer] is arrested and detained, usually
at the discretion of his parole [probation] officer. '248 While the
cases required that there be a preliminary hearing to insure that
there was probable cause for the arrest, the Court found that the
parolee's/probationer's rights are not violated when the parole/
probation officer issues an arrest warrant.
The importance of State v. Franks, however, goes beyond
the holding that probation officers may issue arrest warrants. In
determining that "the probationer's rights are adequately pro-
tected," the court recognized a prisoner's standing to question
the constitutionality of a search and seizure.249 Unwilling to take
this step in State v. Hiott,2 50 the court held in that case that two
escaped prisoners did not have standing to challenge the consti-
tutionality of a search and seizure since, as escaped prisoners,
they could not have any "legitimate expectation of privacy.
'251
Although the applicability of the holding to prisoners in general
was unclear, the court stated that
It follows that appellant's Fourth Amendment rights were no
greater as an escapee than they were while he was within the
245. S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-450 (1976).
246. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
247. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
248. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 485.
249. - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 228. The current requirement for standing is that
the complainant have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched or the
property seized. To determine if the claimant has a legitimate expectation of privacy, the
Court adopted a two-fold test: (1) the claimant must have exhibited an actual expecta-
tion of privacy; and (2) the expectation must be one which society recognizes as reasona-
ble. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1 (1977); and United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
250. 276 S.C. 72, 276 S.E.2d 163 (1981).
251. Id. at 77, 276 S.E.2d at 165.
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confines of the penitentiary. He had lost his constitutional pro-
tection against the invasion of his privacy and had no standing
to object to a search of his [motel] room and his effects by the
officers.
252
Yet the court in State v. Franks cited State v. Hiott as standing
for the proposition that "[i]t is elementary that while conviction
and imprisonment do not strip the violator of his rights, those
privileges are severely diminished. 2 53 By its interpretation of
State v. Hiott and its recognition of a probationer's standing,
the court in State v. Franks implicitly recognizes prisoners'
fourth amendment rights, though diminished, to protection
against unreasonable invasions of privacy. This position is con-
sistent with the earlier opinion of State v. Ellefson,25 in which
the South Carolina Supreme Court stated that "[e]ven a con-
victed prisoner does not shed basic constitutional rights at the
prison gate. Rather, he 'retains all the rights of an ordinary citi-
zen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken
from him by law.' "1255
The positions of the United States Supreme Court and the
South Carolina Supreme Court on the fourth amendment rights
are similar. While the United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized other constitutional protection for prisoners,2 58 and has
carefully avoided rejecting the applicability of the fourth
amendment to a prisoner's interest in privacy,2 57 the Court has
not specifically held that a prisoner retains his fourth amend-
252. Id. at 78, 276 S.E.2d at 166 (citing Robinson v. State, 312 So. 2d 15 (Miss.
1975)).
253. - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 228.
254. 266 S.C. 494, 224 S.E.2d 666 (1976).
255. Id. at 500, 224 S.E.2d at 669 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974);
Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944)).
256. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 549 (1979); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972); Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972); and Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333-34 (1968).
257. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 556-57 (1979); Stroud v. United States,
251 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1919). The court in Bell v. Wolfish postulated that a person confined
in a detention facility may have no reasonable expectation of privacy in his room or cell
and is therefore unprotected by the fourth amendment. For the purpose of the decision,
however, the Court assumed that detainees did enjoy such a right. 441 U.S. at 556-57.
Although the Court's remarks were addressed to the fourth amendment claims of pre-
trial detainees, the failure to recognize a fourth amendment right for detainees is, in
effect, a failure to recognize the right for all prisoners, since pre-trial detainees enjoy
rights at least equal to those of convicted prisoners. 441 U.S. at 545.
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ment rights. Nevertheless, several lower federal courts have
taken the final step and expressly recognized a diminished
fourth amendment right of prisoners.258
The merit of recognizing diminished fourth amendment
rights of prisoners can be found by examining the potential
damage of denying fourth amendment protection to prisoners, as
pointed out in United States v. Lilly:
259
Denial of any fourth amendment protection to a prisoner po-
tentially would subject him to any form of search and seizure,
no matter how abusive or intrusive, conducted at the hands of
any prison employee who is so inclined, provided only that the
search and seizures do not rise to the level of cruel and unusual
punishment .... Therefore, as the fourth amendment man-
dates, searches and seizures conducted on prisoners must be
reasonable under all the facts and circumstances in which they
are performed. 60
While law enforcement officials, such as prison guards and pro-
bation officers, should have the maximum possible freedom in
controlling prisoners and protecting society, this freedom should
never be allowed to go beyond the bounds of reasonableness.
The decision in State v. Franks, interpreting section 24-21-
450 as constitutionally allowing probation officers to issue arrest
warrants for probationers, is therefore consistent with the
United States Supreme Court decisions on the rights of proba-
tioners and prisoners. While Franks clarified the position of the
court regarding prisoners' rights in general, this position may
still be subject to varied interpretations in regard to the fourth
amendment claims of prisoners and probationers. The court
should thus take the final step and expressly recognize the rights
of prisoners to diminished fourth amendment protections.
Robert W. Hayes, Jr.
258. See, e.g., United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1978); Bonner v.
Caughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1975).
259. 576 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1978).
260. Id. at 1244 (citations omitted).
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VIII. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
A. Fifth Amendment Privilege in Bifurcated Capital Trials
In State v. Adams, 2 '1 the South Carolina Supreme Court
defined the scope of the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination at the two stages of a capital trial and applied an
"arbitrary factor" standard to the guilt phase of the trial.62 The
court held that the solicitor's cross-examination of the defen-
dant regarding his punishment263 at the guilt stage of the bifur-
cated trial violated the defendant's fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination 264 and constituted an arbitrary fac-
tor26 5 requiring reversal.
The defendant was charged with murder, kidnapping,
housebreaking and armed robbery.2 6 He subsequently signed a
confession in the presence of police officers and his attorney.67
During the guilt phase of the trial, the solicitor repeatedly asked
the defendant on cross-examination whether he thought that an-
yone who committed the cruel, brutal acts contained in his con-
fession should die. Defendant's counsel made no timely objec-
tion to these questions about punishment.268 At the conclusion
of the sentencing phase of the trial, the defendant was sentenced
to death upon the jury's recommendation. The South Carolina
Supreme Court, on appeal, ruled that the solicitor's cross-exami-
261. - S.C. -, 283 S.E.2d 582 (1981).
262. The South Carolina Death Penalty Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-20 to -28
(Supp. 1980) provides for a bifurcated trial in capital cases. Upon conviction for murder
in the first stage of the proceeding, a separate sentencing proceeding is held to determine
whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-20(B)(Supp. 1980).
263. Record at 950, 951.
264. - S.C. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 585. The fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution provides in part that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself." In Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the Si-
preme Court ruled that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is appli-
cable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
265. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25 (Supp. 1980), provides in part: "(B) The Supreme
Court of South Carolina shall consider the punishment as well as any errors by way of
appeal. (C) With regard to the sentence, the court shall determine: (1) Whether the sen-
tence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbi-
trary factor. .. ."
266. Record at ii.
267. Id. at 724-25.
268. - S.C. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 584.
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nation questions during the guilt phase of the trial violated the
defendant's fifth amendment privilege against coerced self-in-
crimination and constituted an arbitrary factor, resulting in
prejudicial error. The court reversed the convictions, vacated the
death sentence and remanded the case for a new trial.
26 9
In Adams, the court explained that each phase of the bifur-
cated proceeding required by statutory law must address a sepa-
rate issue.270 The issue in the first phase of a capital trial is
whether the defendant is innocent or guilty of murder. The issue
in the second phase is whether the defendant should live or
die.271 The court reasoned that a defendant who waives his privi-
lege against self-incrimination by taking the witness stand in the
guilt or innocence phase of the trial may only be impeached re-
garding issues related to his guilt or innocence. The court fur-
ther indicated that in a bifurcated proceeding, the defendant
may elect to exercise his privilege against self-incrimination by
refusing to testify at the sentencing proceeding even after testi-
fying at the guilt stage. 7 The court concluded that the solici-
tor's persistent questioning about punishment during the guilt
phase violated the defendant's privilege against coerced self-
incrimination.
It is well settled that the death penalty may not be imposed
under procedures that create a substantial risk that the punish-
ment will be inflicted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.273 In
upholding the constitutionality of the Georgia death penalty
statute in Gregg v. Georgia,274 the United States Supreme Court
noted that the statutory requirement of automatic appeal of
death sentences to the state's supreme court provides an impor-
tant safeguard against the arbitrary imposition of the death pen-
alty.275 Because of the finality of the death penalty, state su-
preme courts review the trial record and transcript whenever the
death sentence is imposed.
The South Carolina Supreme Court's previous applications
269. Id. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 588.
270. Id. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 584; S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Supp. 1980).
271. - S.C. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 584.
272. Id. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 585.
273. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
274. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
275. Id. at 198.
1982]
47
Widener et al.: Criminal Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEw
of the "arbitrary factor" language in section 16-3-25(C)(1) of the
South Carolina Code 278 have concerned errors in the sentencing
phase of a bifurcated trial.2 7 These applications have been con-
sistent with a careful reading of section 16-3-25(B) and (C)(1).
278
The arbitrary factor language applies only to the sentencing
phase. In Adams, the court applied the arbitrary factor standard
to the guilt phase as well. This interpretation, although not con-
sistent with a strict reading of the statute, seems appropriate
considering the language in section 16-3-25(B) providing for re-
view of "any errors.- 27 9 The same violations that would offend
an arbitrary factor standard at the sentencing stage might well
be considered prejudicial error at the guilt phase.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has made a sound deci-
sion in Adams by strengthening the procedural protection in-
tended in bifurcated capital trials. The addition of a further pro-
tection to defendants by expanding the application of the
arbitrary factor standard is warranted by the finality of the
death penalty. As a result of the Adams decision, prosecuting
attorneys must confine cross-examination of defendants to issues
related to the accused's guilt or innocence in the first phase of a
bifurcated trial.
Wendy B. Harvey
B. Doctrine of Implied Acquittal and Capital Sentencing
In State v. Gilbert (Gilbert 1I),20 the South Carolina Su-
preme Court considered the application of the double jeopardy
prohibition 281 to the sentencing stage of capital cases. The court
276. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25(C)(1)(Supp. 1980); see supra note 265.
277. See, e.g., State v. Woomer, - S.C. -, 284 S.E.2d 357 (1981)(solicitor's per-
sonal opinion given in jury argument at sentencing phase); State v. Goolsby, 275 S.C.
110, 268 S.E.2d 31 (1980) and State v. Tyner, 273 S.C. 646, 258 S.E.2d 559 (1979)(omis-
sion of a necessary jury instruction during the sentencing phase); State v. Gilbert, 273
S.C. 690, 258 S.E.2d 890 (1979)(improper closing prosecutorial argument constituted
prejudicial error). For a discussion of Woomer, see infra notes 305-27 and accompanying
text.
278. See supra note 265.
279. Id.
280. - S.C. -, 283 S.E.2d 179 (1981).
281. The fifth amendment of the Constitution states in part that no person shall "be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy. . . ." The traditional rationale
for the prohibition has been that the State should not be allowed to use its resources and
[Vol. 34
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held that the doctrine of implied acquittal282 did not apply to
lesser included aggravating circumstances. 2 3 Few courts have
considered this issue.
The defendants were convicted of murder by the jury in the
guilt phase of their first trial (Gilbert I).24 The State's evidence
tended to establish the following course of events.285 The defen-
dants shot and stabbed a service station attendant, who subse-
quently died from the wounds. They then attempted to steal the
contents of the cash register but were unsuccessful in opening it.
During their flight, a wallet belonging to the victim's wife was
taken from the back storage room. After the conviction, a sen-
power to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense. Green
v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). Recent cases, however, have indicated a
shift to a different rationale, i.e. whether or not the ending of the trial was based on an
adjudication of innocence. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978); Burks v. United
States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978). The prohibition was held to be applicable to the states via the
fourteenth amendment in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). The prohibition
is also applicable to the sentencing stage of bifurcated capital cases. Bullington v. Mis-
souri, 101 S. Ct. 1852 (1981).
282. The doctrine of implied acquittal was announced in Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184 (1957). The court held that the jury's conviction on a lesser charge
amounted to an implicit acquittal of the greater charge. Thus, double jeopardy bars a
second trial on the greater charge even if the defendant successfully appeals the convic-
tion and obtains a new trial. Id. at 190-91. The implied acquittal argument in Gilbert II,
however, is different. The defendants argued that the jury's failure to find an aggravating
circumstance amounted to an acquittal. Amicus Brief at 5.
283. The court also upheld the validity of submitting lesser included aggravating
circumstances. The defendants challenged this practice as being an arbitrary factor influ-
encing the jury's recommendation of death. Amicus Brief at 6. The court reasoned that
this practice was not reversible error because the other aggravating circumstance was
sufficient standing alone to justify imposing the death penalty. The court apparently
concluded that the second jury would have recommended death with instruction on
armed robbery only. Gilbert II, - S.C. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 182. The court cited
Gerberding v. Swenson, 435 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1970), in support of this reasoning. The
South Carolina Supreme Court's reliance on Gerberding may be misplaced. That case
involved mandatory sentencing, whereas Gilbert II involved discretionary sentencing.
Gerberding concerned an enhanced sentencing procedure wherein three prior convictions
were submitted, one invalidly so. This was not constitutional error, however, because the
other two were validly submitted and established. Once one prior conviction was estab-
lished the maximum sentence for the present crime was required. No such requirement
exists in the South Carolina statute. In fact, the jury is always free to give life imprison-
ment rather than death regardless of how heinous the murder may have been.
In a subsequent case, State v. Woomer, - S.C. -, 284 S.E.2d 357 (1981), the court
upheld the use of lesser included aggravating circumstances with an entirely different
rationale. See infra notes 314, 320-24 and accompanying text.
284. 273 S.C. 690, 258 S.E.2d 890 (1979).
285. Record at 1353, 1358-60 (Gilbert II, vol. 6).
49
Widener et al.: Criminal Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tencing trial was held before the same jury. Two aggravating cir-
cumstances were submitted to the jury: (1) larceny with the use
of a deadly weapon and (2) armed robbery. H8 The jury found
armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt and sentenced the de-
fendants to death.287 The jury made no specific finding as to lar-
ceny with the use of a deadly weapon.2 8
The case was automatically appealed to the South Carolina
Supreme Court.2 89 The court affirmed the conviction, but va-
cated the death penalty on its own motion because of improper
closing arguments by the solicitor.290 The court remanded the
case for a new sentencing trial.
The second sentencing jury was also given a charge of
armed robbery and larceny with the use of a deadly weapon as
aggravating circumstances.9 ' Defense counsel did not object to
this charge.2 92 The second jury found both aggravating circum-
stances to exist beyond a reasonable doubt and sentenced the
defendants to death.2 3 The case was again automatically ap-
pealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court. On appeal, the de-
fendants challenged the validity of the death penalty on grounds
of the double jeopardy doctrine of implied acquittal. The court
denied this challenge and affirmed the death sentences.294 The
court concluded that the larceny with the use of a deadly
weapon charge was a lesser included offense of the armed rob-
bery charge under the particular facts of this case. Thus, the
first jury's finding of armed robbery necessarily involved a find-
ing of larceny with the use of a deadly weapon, and there was no
implied acquittal in Gilbert I. Therefore, the resubmission of the
larceny charge in Gilbert II did not violate the double jeopardy
prohibition." 5
The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed
the implied acquittal issue raised in Gilbert II. At least two
286. Gilbert II, - S.C. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 182.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Gilbert I, 273 S.C. at 692, 258 S.E.2d at 891.
290. Id. at 697-98, 258 S.E.2d at 894.
291. Gilbert II, - S.C. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 182.
292. Additional Brief for Respondent at 4 (State's Brief, Gilbert II).
293. Gilbert II, - S.C. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 182.
294. Id. at , 283 S.E.2d at 181.
295. Id. at , 283 S.E.2d at 182.
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states, North Carolina and Georgia, have done so under death
penalty statutes similar to the South Carolina statute.', The
Georgia Supreme Court decided that double jeopardy did not
bar resubmission,297 whereas the North Carolina Supreme Court
reached a contrary decision.29 8
The Georgia Supreme Court relied on two rationales in
reaching its decision. First, the court drew a distinction between
conviction and punishment, concluding that double jeopardy
bars only a second attempt at conviction, not punishment.299 In
addition, the court drew a distinction between offenses and ag-
gravating circumstances, concluding that double jeopardy ap-
plies only to offenses and that aggravating circumstances are not
offenses.300 The North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that
the first jury's failure to find an aggravating circumstance
amounted to an acquittal and its resubmission was thereby pre-
cluded by the double jeopardy prohibition.30 1
The South Carolina Supreme Court did not consider the
Georgia rationales and rejected the North Carolina rationale of
implied acquittal. However, the South Carolina Supreme Court's
rejection may have been a limited one. The court's lesser in-
cluded offense rationale began with the limiting phrase of
"[u]nder the particular facts of this case. 3 0 2 Thus, the court
might still find an implied acquittal in a case with aggravating
circumstances which do not involve a fact situation of lesser in-
cluded offenses. Therefore, defense counsel should not abandon
the implied acquittal argument.
Defense counsel should also object to the resubmission of
previously submitted but unfound aggravating circumstances.
Defense counsel in Gilbert II did not object.30 3 The court did not
discuss this failure to object, but the state did bring it to the
court's attention in its brief.304 In any event, this possible waiver
296. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-10, -20, -25, and -26 (Supp. 1980) with GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 26-1101; 27-2514, -2528, -2534.1 and -2537 (1978) and N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
14-17 (1981); 15A-2000 (Supp. 1981); 15A-2001, -2002 (1978).
297. Redd v. State, 242 Ga. 876, 252 S.E.2d 383 (1979).
298. State v. Silhan, 302 N.C. 223, 275 S.E.2d 450 (1981).
299. Redd v. State, 242 Ga. at 885, 252 S.E.2d at 389.
300. Id.
301. State v. Silhan, 302 N.C. at -, 275 S.E.2d at 482.
302. Gilbert II, - S.C. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 182.
303. See supra note 292.
304. Id.
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issue should always be prevented by objection.
Finally, either the court or the legislature should consider
the promulgation of a rule amending the South Carolina capital
punishment statutory complex. The proposed amendment would
require the sentencing jury to affirmatively find for or against
the defendant as to each aggravating circumstance submitted.
Such a rule would prevent the double jeopardy issue of implied
acquittal from arising in the sentencing phase of capital cases.
Robert L. Widener
C. Limitation on Scope of Examination; Multiple
Aggravating Circumstances; Arbitrary Factors Influencing a
Death Sentence
In State v. Woomer,30 5 the South Carolina Supreme Court
addressed three procedural issues in the area of criminal law.
The court held first that the defendant had a right to rely on a
limitation on the scope of examination while testifying, even
though the limitation was erroneously granted. Second, the
court held that submitting multiple aggravating circumstances
to the sentencing jury was permissible under the South Carolina
death penalty statute, even though two of the aggravating cir-
cumstances were lesser included offenses of the third.30 Finally,
the solicitor's expression of personal opinion in his closing argu-
ment was held to be a violation of the state statute requiring
that a death sentence be free from the influence of any arbitrary
factor.30 7 This case is one of several recent decisions in which the
court has interpreted and applied the South Carolina death pen-
alty statute0 and represents part of the court's continuing ef-
fort to clarify procedural standards for death penalty cases.
In Woomer, the defendant was charged with robbery and
murder. Woomer's trial was separated into guilt and sentencing
305. - S.C. -, 284 S.E.2d 357 (1981).
306. Id. at , 284 S.E.2d at 358-59.
307. Id. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 358-59.
308. See, e.g., State v. Gilbert, - S.C. -, 283 S.E.2d 179 (1981); State v. Lindler,
276 S.C. 304, 278 S.E.2d 335 (1981); State v. Woomer, 276 S.C. 258, 277 S.E.2d 696
(1981); State v. Goolsby, 275 S.C. 110, 268 S.E.2d 31 (1980); State v. Gilbert, 273 S.C.
690, 258 S.E.2d 890 (1979); State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799 cert. denied 444
U.S. 957 (1979); State v. Tyner, 273 S.C. 690, 258 S.E.2d 890 (1979).
[Vol. 34118
52
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol34/iss1/8
CRIMINAL LAW
phases pursuant to the South Carolina death penalty statute.309
During the guilt phase of the trial, Woomer agreed to testify af-
ter the trial judge limited the scope of examination to the ques-
tion of the voluntariness of his confession. The judge allowed the
jury to remain in the courtroom during this testimony. During
cross-examination, the solicitor asked Woomer two questions re-
garding his guilt or innocence.3 10 The trial judge sustained objec-
tions to these questions but Woomer was subsequently found
guilty.
During the sentencing phase of the trial, the solicitor, in his
closing argument, told the jury that the solicitor was "the only
person in the world that [could] decide whether a person is go-
ing to be tried for his life or not.""31 The solicitor apparently
made this statement in an attempt to reduce the jurors' feeling
of responsibility for imposing the death penalty.
In instructing the sentencing jury, the trial judge submitted
three aggravating circumstances for the jury's consideration:
(1) robbery with a deadly weapon; (2) murder for the purpose
of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value; and
(3) larceny with a deadly weapon. 312 The jury found that all
three circumstances were present and sentenced Woomer to
death.
On appeal, Woomer claimed that the solicitor's violation of
the limitation on the scope of examination was fundamentally
unfair.3 13 He also asserted that the trial judge erred in submit-
ting the three aggravating circumstances to the sentencing jury
309. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-10 to -40 (1976 and Supp. 1980).
310. - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 358.
311. Id. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 359. The solicitor's comments were made during the
following address to the jury:
"You know, the initial burden in this case was not on you all. It was on
me. I am the only person in the world that can decide whether a person is
going to be tried for his life or not. I mean I had the same thing you all did. I
had to make up my mind in regards to this and under the law, if there is any
question about it, you ask the judge, I have to make the first decision as to
whether or not a person is going to be tried for the electric chair. If I didn't
want him tried for the electric chair, there is no way the Sheriff or anybody
else can make it happen. I had to make this same decision, so I have had to go
through the same identical thing that you all do. It is not easy."
Id.
312. Id. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 358.
313. Id. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 358.
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when two were lesser included circumstances of the third.314 Fin-
ally, Woomer claimed that the solicitor's closing argument dur-
ing the sentencing phase of the trial was so prejudicial that it
denied him a fair trial. 315 In holding that the solicitor's cross-
examination of Woomer was improper, the court acknowledged
the general rule that a defendant waives his privilege against
self-incrimination when he takes the stand in his own behalf and
concluded that there is no basis for granting a limitation on the
scope of examination. 316 The court also observed that the volun-
tariness of Woomer's confession should have been decided out of
the jury's presence.317 The court ruled, however, that the propri-
ety of granting the limitation was not at issue. The trial court's
assurance of a limited scope of examination induced the defen-
dant to testify and the defendant therefore had a right to rely on
the limitation. The court held that the solicitor's violation of the
limitation was fundamentally unfair 18 and the trial court's cura-
tive instruction could not remedy the unfairness.31 9
The court could have disposed of this issue by relying on its
conclusion that an in camera hearing was necessary for consider-
ation of the voluntariness of Woomer's confession. The court,
however, chose to base its holding on the proposition that a de-
fendant has the right to rely on a limitation on the scope of ex-
amination once the limitation is granted. Apparently the court
was attempting to set guidelines to protect against future abuses
and costly second trials in those cases in which limitations are
erroneously granted. Whatever the possible bases for the hold-
ing, the court properly was concerned with maintaining the in-
tegrity and fairness of a capital trial.
The court next considered the appellant's claim that the
trial judge erred in submitting three aggravating circumstances
to the sentencing jury when two of the circumstances charged
314. Id. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 358.
315. Id. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 359. In addition, the appellant asserted that the trial
judge failed to instruct the jury that they could impose life imprisonment instead of the
death penalty. The court agreed and remanded partly on this basis. Id.
316. - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 358 (citing Brown v. United States, 358 U.S. 148,
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 948 (1958); State v. Gilbert, 273 S.C. 690, 258 S.E.2d 890 (1979).
317. - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 358.
318. Id. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 358 (citing Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189
(1943), as cited in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976)).
319. - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 358.
[Vol. 34
54
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol34/iss1/8
1982] CRIMINAL LAW
were lesser included offenses of the third. The court ruled that
since all three circumstances were listed in the death penalty
statute '2 0 as aggravating circumstances and the statutory lan-
guage allowed submission of "any" enumerated circumstances
supported by the evidence, submission of all three circumstances
was proper.32 1
The issue before the court was the legislature's intent in
enumerating several closely related aggravating circumstances,
all of which could apply to the same incident of behavior. The
court, however, did not address the legislative intent beyond a
cursory examination of the wording of the statute and failed to
find it significant that each of the aggravating circumstances
submitted in Woomer could apply to conduct that would not in-
clude the other two.3 22 This possibility lends support to the ar-
gument that the legislature intended to list distinct aggravating
circumstances for submission to the jury rather than allow sub-
mission of multiple aggravating circumstances arising from one
incident. 2
South Carolina law requires any sentence of death to be free
from the influence of any arbitrary factor.32 4 Arguably, submit-
320. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(c) (Supp. 1980) provides in pertinent part: "(C) The
judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to consider,
any mitigating circumstances otherwise authorized or allowed by law and any of the fol-
lowing statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances which may be supported by
the evidence ...
321. - S.C. at __, 284 S.E.2d at 358. The court cited State v. Gilbert, - S.C. -,
283 S.E.2d 179 (1981) (Gilbert II), in support of its decision to uphold submission of
multiple aggravating circumstances. In Gilbert II, however, the court relied upon an en-
tirely different rationale. See supra note 283.
322. The charge of committing murder for pecuniary gain applies to the situation in
which someone commits murder in an attempt to collect insurance or an inheritance. It
is possible to commit larceny without committing robbery, but robbery will always in-
clude larceny. State v. Gilbert, - S.C. -, 283 S.E.2d 179 (1981).
323. Florida is apparently the only other state that has addressed this issue. The
Florida Supreme Court consistently has held that it is error to submit multiple aggravat-
ing circumstances for jury consideration in sentencing when they refer to a single inci-
dent of conduct. See, e.g., White v. State, 403 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1981); Maggard v. State,
399 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1981); Gafford v. State, 387 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1980); Provence v.
State, 337 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1976).
324. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25 (1980 Supp.) provides that:
(A) Whenever the death penalty is imposed, and upon the judgment
becoming final in the trial court, the sentence shall be reviewed on the record
by the Supreme Court of South Carolina..
(C) With regard to the sentence, the court shall determine:
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ting lesser included aggravating circumstances to a jury of lay
people is such an arbitrary factor. The trial judge has the ability
to make the defendant's conduct seem more reprehensible to the
jury by submitting multiple charges because the jury may not
realize that only one act is involved. It is doubtful that the legis-
lature intended such a result when it drafted the provisions on
aggravating circumstances. Whatever the legislative intent, the
court should construe the statute to avoid any possiblity that a
death sentence will be handed down under the influence of an
arbitrary factor.
Finally, the court found that the solicitor's closing argument
to the sentencing jury was an improper attempt to reduce the
jury's sense of responsibility for the defendant's fate. 25 The
court rejected this strategy, observing that "[w]hen a solicitor's
personal opinion is explicitly injected into the jury's deliberation
as though it were in itself evidence justifying a sentence of
death, the resulting death sentence may not be free from the
influence of any arbitrary factor" as required by South Carolina
law326 and the eighth amendment. This decision reflects the
court's effort to ensure the jury's independent decision based
solely on admissible evidence and unaffected by outside opinion
and bias. Woomer thus adds to the developing South Carolina
law on what constitutes an arbitrary factor requiring reversal of
a death sentence. 27
As South Carolina nears the time when death sentences will
be carried out, the courts will be subject to closer judicial and
public scrutiny to ensure that such sentences are imposed im-
partially. It is therefore important that any death sentence be
handed down in a manner free from all error and arbitrary fac-
tors. In Woomer, the court advanced this goal by holding that
the solicitor's improper cross examination and closing argument
denied the defendant a fair trial. The court, however, did not
adequately consider the legislative intent underlying the statu-
tory enumeration of aggravating circumstances and therefore
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence
of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor,.
325. - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 359.
326. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-3-25(C)(1) (Supp. 1980). See supra note 324.
327. See also State v. Adams, - S.C. -. , 283 S.E.2d 582 (1981). For a discussion of
Adams, see supra notes 261-79 and accompanying text.
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left open the possibility that future death sentences may not be
free from arbitrariness when multiple aggravating circumstances
are submitted in reference to a single incident of conduct.
R. Kent Porth
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